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CHAPTER I 
IRRODUCTIOH 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response and 
Compensation Liability Act {CERCLA}, better known as 
Superfund, was enacted in 1980 in the wake of widely 
publicized concerns over toxic spills and hazardous waste 
problems at Love Canal, Valley of the Drums, and other sites 
throughout the country. In order to facilitate the cleanup 
of hazardous waste sites considered to be a threat to human 
health and the environment, Congress authorized the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop a "national 
priorities list" (NPL) of the nation's worst hazardous waste 
sites. The EPA initially received $1.6 billion to respond 
to and administer the cleanup of 400 such sites. 1 In 1986, 
Congress amended CERCLA by enacting the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act (SARA), which reauthorized CERCLA 
and increased the Superfund to $8.5 billion to deal with an 
enlarged NFL (Mason 1991). 
The problem facing Congress in 1980 was how to ensure 
the cleanup of contaminated sites without placing a strain 
on the general revenues or raising taxes. During the floor 
debate over CERCLA's passage in 1980, a strong notion 
emerged that past polluters should be required to pay for 
the cleanup of such hazardous waste sites, either directly 
or by reimbursing the government for any response actions 
that may have occurred (Greve and Smith 1992). As a result 
1 
CERCLA promoted two basic goals: (1) that the polluter pay 
for site cleanups; and (2) that cleanup be completed in a 
timely fashion. Congress hoped that forcing potentially 
responsible parties (PRPS ) to internalize the costs of 
haphazard waste disposal would be an effective method of 
penalizing PRPs as well as deterring such behavior (Mason 
1991 and Mullins 1991). Tbe Act authorized the EPA to 
utilize CERCLA's comprehensive liability standard in order 
to compel voluntary or involuntary private party cleanups.2 
In instances where there was an immediate threat to the 
human health and environment, the agency was authorized to 
use Superfund monies for cleanup, after which the EPA may 
pursue private parties for contribution costs using the 
liability standard established by CERCLA. 3 
SuperfuDd Progress to Date 
Between 1980 and 1991, PRPs financed 52 percent of the 
cleanups started and 46 percent of the cleanups completed. 
Over $6 billion in cleanup costs or contributions have been 
paid or committed by responsible parties. As of 1992, the 
agency had been involved in 459 cost recovery cases worth an 
estimated $798 million, achieved 1,113 settlements to 
recover $592 million, and returned $359 million to the 
general fund (EPA 1992:12). In addition to private party 
expenditures, approximately $10 billion have been generated 
by special taxes on industry and expended through the 
Superfund for agency overhead, contractor and administrative 
2 
costs, and cleanup costs associated with orphan sites 
(Barnett 1994:20). 
In 1991 a University of Tennessee study put the average 
cleanup cost for a NPL site at $50 million (Russell et. ale 
1991:65). A more recent study estimates the average cleanup 
costs to be $29.1 million for each site. The study took 
into account higher site study costs and the present value 
of operation and maintenance activities that would be 
incurred in the thirty year post-closure-care period 
following the site cleanup (Probst et. ale 1995:20). In 
1994 a report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimated the total cost of cleaning up the current and 
future NPL to be between $106 and $463 billion (Probst et. 
ale 1995: 18 ) .4 
Since 1980, the EPA and the states have investigated 
almost 38,000 potential sites to assess what, if any, 
cleanup is needed. In 1989 the EPA estimated that it would 
take 13 years to begin construction on the then 1,200 NPL 
sites, and that between 75 and 100 sites would be added to 
the list annually (Hedeman et. ale 1994:10423). Today about 
1,320 sites have been placed on the NPL and are considered 
to be the worst in the country (Probst et. ale 1995). At 
the end of the 1993 fiscal year, of the 1,320 sites on the 
NPL, 617 (47 percent) were in the site study or design 
phase. Therefore, no cleanup activity has been taken at 
these sites. Half of all NPL sites had not yet been the 
subject of long-term cleanup, however, more than 40 percent 
3 
had been the subject of removal actions. At the end of 
September 1993, only 52 sites (4 percent) had been deleted 
from the list. Remedies had been completed at another 166 
sites (13 percent), many of which may require long-term 
post-closure operation and maintenance. At 393 sites (30 
percent) cleanup activities were under way (probst et. al. 
1995:18). 
Purpose of the Study 
This study has two main objectives: (I) to describe and 
to evaluate the effect of CERCL 's liability standard on the 
allocation process; and (2) to develop an allocation method 
---
--
~s ef~~c::~~_n~, ~~~!_~able, ~~lo.9~l. The study 
focuses on the use of CERCLA's comprehensive liability 
'scheme and its impact on the allocation process. This study 
----------~----
does not emphasize finding a unique set of conditions 
necessary for deriving a cost or set of costs to be 
• ~_ ..,. ________ ..-. _~._._.. '0 ______ .----. ~ 
~~a~ed. However, the study does investigate the use of 
existing allocation methods and the basic r~Rles oL 
allocating costs. Additionally, the study focuses on 
allocating an identified c q,st or set of costs amon 
-~--
of parties participating in a joint cleanup project.' The 
_ _ ----- ....... ---- -- - •• - • ___ h ________ .____ .-.. _ 0" __ • 
purpose of the study is to develop a cost allocation method 
--.-
that provides a streamlined ap~Qac~_Lo finding the least-
-----_ .... - . 
cost a l location for each PRP coalition. 
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Significance of the study 
The liability standard under CERCLA has resulted in 
numerous law suits, adding to the excessive time and cost 
already associated with site remediation. Because liability 
under CERCLA is strict and joint and several, the court,s 
have ruled that the government does not need to do the 
following: (1) prove a nexus between a PRP's waste disposed 
at a site and the subsequent release or threatened release 
that initiated the response action; or (2) join all the PRPs 
at a site. with so many parties attempting to limit their 
share of liability the costs of devising a cleanup strategy 
and deciding financial responsibility often threaten to 
exceed the actual cleanup costs (Hird 1993). 
Due to the use of such a comprehensive liability 
scheme, a cleanup can be significantly delayed and overall 
cleanup costs can increase dramatically while the involved 
parties continue to debate their relative contributions. As 
a result some transaction costs are i-Lvitablr ' especially roc 'B 1:I 'r. L~ 
-- II...!!:. '-
when considering the number of parties and amount of time 
spent debating relative contributions. 6 Therefore, the 
process is generally considered to be an inefficient and 
inequitable attempt at allocating financial responsibility 
(Tietenberg 1989, Singer 1992, Hird 1993, Brazell and 
Gerardi 1994, Hall et. ale 1994, and Probst et. ale 1995). 
5 
Overvi.ew of the St.udy 
This investigation. requires a combination of 
information from four areas of related research. The 
relevant research areas, include the following: (I) an 
extensive literature review of the Superfund liability 
standard and its implementation; (2) a review of CERCLA's 
economic efficiency; (3) a review of the decision criteria 
considered during the allocation process; and (4) a review 
of the principles used in the allocation of jOint project 
costs. A review of these areas provide an understanding of 
--why the program is considered to be an inefficient and 
inequitable attempt at allocating financial responsibility. 
The investigation focuses on the use of cooperative game 
theory methods used in allocating costs for water resource 
projects. Applying these principles of fairness aids in 
developing a cost allocation method that is an efficient and 
equitable alternative to traditional approaches. 
The proposed allocation method relies on the formation 
of cooperative coalitions and the use of existing 
cooperative game theory methods in order to allocate 
Superfund cleanup costs. 1 In order to facilitate the 
implementation of the proposed method, the study will employ 
the use of data based loosely on PRP involvement at the 
Hardage Criner Superfund Site located near Criner, 
Oklahoma. 8 Conclusions and recommendations are offered in 
order to identify the required conditions for any allocation 
method to be successful and the purpose of future studies. 
6 
CIIapter Kotes 
1. An excise tax on forty-two hazardous feedstock 
chemicals, as well as on crude oil and imported petroleum 
products, was the source of about 86% of the original 
Superfund. The remainder of the original Superfund monies 
came from general revenues. See Mason 1991:79. 
2. A responding PRP will generally engage in the 
negotiation of a final settlement. A non-responding PRP 
will be the target of a government cost recovery action. 
3. The comprehensive liability standard adopted by 
CERCLA is strict, joint and several, and retroactive. See 
Mullins 1991:36. 
4. This has a current dollar value of between $42 and 
$120 billion. See Probst eta al. 1995:18. 
5. Such an approach would presumedly minim.ize 
litigation among PRPs due to the fact that the participants 
would have agreed to the conditions prior to the final 
allocation. 
6. Direct regulation under CERLCA is costly due to both 
public and private expenditures on administration, staff, 
and general overhead costs. 
7. The proposed method is based on current methods used 
in the cost allocation of water resource projects. The 
minimum costs, remaining savings (MCRS) method is presented 
and implemented through a generalized case study. 
8. In 1984, the EPA notified companies that had legally 
disposed of materials at the Hardage Site that they were 
potentially responsible for cleanup at the site under 
CERCLA. Following this notification, more than 100 PRPs 
formed the Hardage Steering Committee (HSC). See Costello 
1995:1. The HSC independently identified and negotiated a 
settlement with a group of non-responding PRPs. The 
negotiations were based on data relative to the parties 
activities at the site. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter investigates the Superfund process and the 
use of its comprehen.sive liability standard. The adopted 
liability standard was intended to facilitate the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites. However, due to the litigious nature 
of such a strict liability standard, the Superfund process 
has been plagued by numerous delays and exce'ssive 
transaction costs. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter 
is to investigate the implementation of the liability 
------~--~- ~ --. 
standard adopted by CERCLA and its effect on the allocation 
~ r-.- """1_ --
process.~ The relevant areas of the literature include a 
review of the following areas: (l) the statutory framework 
of CERCLA; (2) the judicial precedents; (3) the economic 
efficiency of CERCLA's comprehensive liability standard; and 
(4) the current allocation methods. 
The S~a~utory Framework of CERCLA 
CERCLA was intended to facilitate the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites and, when possible, to impose strict, 
joint and several, and retroactive liability for response 
action costs. The comprehensive liability scheme for 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites enables the EPA to compel 
responsible parties to voluntarily cleanup sites or 
reimburse the agency for its cleanup expenses. Congress 
hoped that forcing PRPs to internalize the costs of 
8 
haphazard waste disposal would be an effective method of 
both penalizing responsible parties as well as deterring 
such behavior in the future (Mason 1991 and Mullins 1991). 
Sumaary of the Liability Scheme 
Under section 104, the government is authorized to 
investigate and cleanup a release or threatened release of 
any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant that may 
present an inuninent and substantial danger to the human 
health or the environment. under section 106, the 
government may seek an injunction directing a responsible 
party to initiate a response action. If the party does not 
respond the EPA may bring an action to enforce compliance. 
Finally, if the government undertakes a response action, it 
may initiate a cost recovery action under section 107 (42 
U.S.C. 9604, 9606 and 9607 (1988) and Hall et. ale 1994). 
The liability standard provides that certain "persons" 
be held responsible for response costs associated with 
cleanup activities. Section 107 of CERCLA defines certain 
"persons" to include the following: (1) present owners or 
operators of the facility; (2) any past owners or operators 
dur ing whose tenure the s·ubstana:es were disposed; (3) 
generators who arranged to have their wastes deposited; and 
(4) any party involved in the transportation of the 
substances for treatment or disposal (42 u.s.c. 9607 (1988), 
Mank 1991, Mason 1991, and Hall et. ale 1994). 
9 
All four classes of PRPS may be held liable for 
response costs, damages to natural resources, and the cost 
of conducting studies on the health effects of the hazardous 
substances present at a site (Mason 1991). There are only 
three limited defenses available to the potentially 
\ 
responsible parties: (1) that the release or threatened 
release resulted from an act of God; (2) from an act of war 
or; (3) from the act of a third party not in any contractual 
relationship with the PRP (42 u.s.C. 9607 (1988), Mank 1991, 
and Mason 1991).1 
The severity of the Superfund liability scheme may be 
understood from the following: (1) it is imposed without any 
showing of fault or knowledge; (2) it is retroactive for 
actions and practices that were legal, normal, and 
considered proper at the time; (3) it is not related to 
whether the wastes treated or disposed of caused the 
conditions requiring the cleanup; and (4) the standard is 
joint and several, which means that anyone PRP can be 
required to pay the total cost of cleanup at a site 
regardless of the number of existing PRPs (Mullins 1991:36). 
Such an expansive liability scheme only reiterates the 
Congressional intent regarding who should pay for the site 
cleanups. 
10 
The Role Of SARA 
when Congress reauthorized the Superfund program in 
1986, it provided some settlement alternatives designed to 
ease the burden of strict and joint and several liability_ 
SARA provided various mechanisms designed to expedite 
response actions, eliminate excessive litigation, promote 
voluntary cleanups, use Superfund monies more effectively, 
and treat PRPs more fairly. The legislative history of SARA 
indicates that Congress sought to ease the burden of joint 
and several liability by allowing a cause of action for 
contribution. The amendments also provide various 
mechanisms for promoting and negotiating settlement 
agreements between the government and PRPs. 
The Right of Contribution 
Because liability is joint and several, the courts have 
ruled that the government need not join all PRPs at a site. 
The legislative history of SARA indicates that Congress 
sought to ease the burden of joint and several liability by 
allowing a cause of action for contribution. Congress hoped 
that this new provision would stimulate quicker cleanups by 
encouraging PRPs to undertake voluntary actions (Hedeman et. 
al. 1991 and Hall et. al. 1994). Therefore, section 
113(f)(1) of SARA allows a party who has incurred response 
costs to seek contribution from any person who is liable or 
potentially liable under section 107. The right of 
contribution enables a joined party(s) to sue fellow parties 
11 
in order to recover the amount it paid in excess of its fair 
share (42 U.S.C. 9613 (1988) and Hall et. ale 1994). 
However, according to the definition of unjust 
enrichment, a joined party seeking contribution may seek 
only the amount it paid in excess of its fair share, and may 
not coax other liable parties to pay in excess of their fair 
share of the total costs (Restatement (Second) of Torts 886A 
(1979) } .2 The courts have ruled that a PRPs' liability for 
contribution is several, not joint and several (United 
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. (w.n. Mo. 
1985». In cases where an original PRP seeks a claim for 
contribution from a fellow PRP, the third-party PRP is 
liable only for its "fair share" of the harm (Mason 1991). 
Therefore, PRPs found jointly and severally liable at the 
outset are prevented from discharging the full liability to 
a third-party PRP through the contribution process. 
A suit for contribution may arise as a result of one of 
the following circumstances: (I) the government may sue 
multiple parties to force cleanup under section 106 or to 
recover cleanup costs under section 107 of CERCLA; (2) the 
EPA has sued fewer than all the PRPs at a site under section 
106 or 107 and the responding PRPs bring suit against the 
non-responding PRPsi (3) a party that has settled with the 
government for more than its fair share of the cleanup costs 
may seek contribution from other PRPs; and (4) a non-
responding party may bring counterclaim for contribution in 
a cost-recovery suit brought by a responding party who 
12 
intends to or who has cleaned up a site (Garber 1987, 42 
u.s.c. 9606 and 9607 (1988), Mason 1991, and Barnhizer 
1994) • 
Settlement Alternatives 
CERCLA failed to provide the agency or PRPs with any 
explicit guidelines for negotiating a settlement agreement 
(Mason 1991:86-87). Therefore, the SARA amendments 
explicitly authorized the use of the following mechanisms: 
(I) the preparation of nonbinding allocations of 
responsibility (NBARS), in which the EPA could proactively 
make an initial allocation of financial responsibility among 
the parties; (2) the use of mixed funding settlements, which 
enable PRPs to perform various cleanup activities with the 
help of Superfund monies and the EPA; (3) the u,se of de 
minimis buyouts, which allows an eligible party to buyout 
its financial obligation (contribution constitutes less than 
1 percent of the expected cost); and (4) the issuance of 
covenants not to sue, providing a waiver from future 
liability (42 U.S.C. 9622 (1988), Hedeman et. ale 1991, 
Acton and Dixon 1992, and Hall et. ale 1994). Appendix A 
provides a complete definition of each settlement 
alternative. Whenever a negotiation would facilitate a 
settlement with PRPs the government must notify all such 
parties. Section 122 requires that the notice must contain 
the following information: the names and addresses of PRPs, 
the volume and nature of the waste contributed by each PRP, 
13 
and a ranking by volume of the waste found at the site (42 
U.S.C. 9622 (1988) and Cross 1988). Such a notice is 
intended to facilitate prompt and informed settlement offers 
from PRPs. When and if the EPA receives a settlement 
proposal, negotiations should begin immediately {Cross 
1988} • 
These devices offered a departure from pure joint and 
several liability toward some notion of distributive justice 
and fairness during the al location process. The 
alternatives were intended to expedite response actions, 
eliminate excessive litigation, promote voluntary cleanups, 
use Superfund monies more efficiently, and accommodate 
settlement negotiations (42 U.S.C. 9622 (1988) and Mason 
1991). Although the intent of these settlement alternatives 
is to promote prompt cleanups and utilize Superfund monies 
more effectively, delays and high transaction costs continue 
to plague the Superfund process. 
Overall, the limited success of these settlement 
alternatives can generally be attributed to the EPA's 
failure to utilize them on an active and consistent basis. 
Many of the alternatives are at odds with CERCLA's joint and 
several liability scheme as well as the agency's traditional 
approach to negotiations with PRPs. Furthermore, each EPA 
region implements these alternatives with a different 
management strategy, as a result their overall use lacks 
consistency. In other cases the alternatives are simply a 
severe strain on the EPA's resources. For example, when 
14 
performing an NBAR the agency must initiate an extensive 
information gathering process that is both time consuming 
and costly (Hedeman et. al. 1991). 
Of about 1,300 sites on the NPL, the EPA has entered 
into only 125 de minimis settlements at 75 locations 
(Shanoff 1994:12). As of September, 1993, _ the EPA (under 
the mixed fund alternative) had negotiated only four mixed 
work agreements, twelve preathorizations, and an uncertain 
number of cashouts (Hall et. al. 1994:1503). Furthermore, 
there is little evidence that NBARs are being implemented at 
all (Acton and Dixon 1992 and Hall et. al. 1994). 
The Superfund Process 
The process begins when the EPA becomes aware of a 
site. The agency will then perform a series of preliminary 
assessments and inspections in order to determine if a 
threat exists. There are two different actions that can 
take place at a Superfund site: (1) a removal action, and 
( 1)t\ 
(2) a rem~dial action (Lawrence 1993:2962).3 The EPA must 
\ \ ) 
perform any response action within the existing framework of 
CERCLA and the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (Pusch 1991 
and Lawrence 1993).4 Figures 1 and 2 describe the relevant 
steps of each action. The agency will then begin the formal 
process of assigning a hazard-ranking score (HRS) to the 
site. The site will be included on the NPL if it's score is 
greater than 28.5 (Mazmanian and Morell 1992 and Lawrence 
1993).~ Once a site has been included on the NPL, a formal 
15 
study of the sit.e conditions is conducted in order t ·o 
determine the possible remedial actions. 
To simplify the remaining steps of the proces.s, the EPA 
then issues a record of decision (ROD) documenting the 
agency's chosen remedial action, the remedial design is then 
performed, and finally, the ac·tual remedial action is 
conducted and the site is deleted from the NFL (Hedeman et. 
al. 1991 and Lawrence 1993). Appendix B provides a complete 
definition of each Superfund stage. The EPA conducts 
enforcement and public participation activities throughout 
the process. with the ex.ception of the ROD, any of these 
steps may be performed by either the EPA or the identified 
PRPs at the site (Lawrence 1993). Figure 3 summarizes the 
process from site identification to the beginning of the 
actual cleanup. 
The Enforcement Process 
The enforcement process begins after a site is proposed 
for listing on the NPL. Following such a proposal, the EPA 
begins searching for PRPs who may be potentially liable for 
the contamination at the given site. Identified PRPs are 
given a general notice letter and involved in an information 
exchange with the EPA. The information includes site 
conditions, PRP connections to the site, and identification 
of other PRPs (Hedeman et. al. 1991 and Lawrence 1993). 
Figure 4 summarizes the basic enforcement process. 
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The EPA examines the information gathered and makes a 
determination of which PRPs to pursue. The EPA may then 
proceed with either a fund-lead or an enforcement-lead 
cleanup action. 6 Under a fund-lead cleanup action the EPA 
spends Superfund monies on remediati9n at the outset and 
then may enter into a cost recovery action against PRPs at 
the later stage of the cleanup action. Whereas, under an 
enforcement-lead cleanup action, the agency attempts to 
compel PRPs to take voluntary action and finance the cleanup 
from the outset (Hedeman et. al. 1991 and Acton and Dixon 
1992) • 
The agency uses considerable discretion when 
determining the number of PRPs named at a Superfund site. 
The EPA typically names several responsible parties but, in 
general, fewer than the total number involved (Acton and 
Dixon 1992). The EPA's failure to identify all or at least 
a majority of the PRPs at a site may ultimately delay the 
cleanup of the site. The potential effect is to force a PRP 
to pay for the full cleanup costs of a site, despite the 
presence of other parties. 7 Aside from being potentially 
unfair to small contributors, such costs provide an 
incentive for PRPs to delay cleanup through litigation (Hird 
1993). The named PRPs will not want to agree to a 
settl,ement until they are confident of the number of parties 
that should contribute to the final cleanup costs. In 
contrast, non-responding PRPs have a strong incentive to 
avoid being named as PRPs at the site. As a result, the 
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named PRPs are often burdened with substantial transaction 
costs due to the costly process of gathering information 
relevant to identifying other potential responsible parties 
for contribution (Hedeman et. ale 1991). 
The EPA's enforcement policy reflects an "all or 
nothing" approach and there is generally little room for 
negotiation (despite reform attempts). The threat of strict 
and joint and several liability enables the agency to compel 
PRPs to voluntarily settle rather than litigate. Underlying 
this policy is the EPA's belief that most PRPs would choose 
to negotiate an agreement with the government that allowed 
for the total or substantial cleanup of a site in exchange 
for a favorable settlement. The process is commonly 
characterized as a "carrot and stick" approach. PRPs who 
settle or otherwise quickly discharge their liability are 
offered a "carrot" in the form of protection from suits for 
contribution by other PRPs, and can recover response costs 
for which they are not directly liable. PRPs who choose not 
to settle are given the "stick" in the form of joint and 
several liability (Barnhizer 1994:566). 
A Review of the Judicial Precedents 
Although CERCLA did not establish an explicit liability 
standard, section 101 of the Act states that the "standard 
of liability" shall be the same as that of section 311 of 
the Clean Water Act (42 U.S.C. 9601 (1988) and Mason 1991). 
According to CERCLA's legislative history Congress chose to 
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defer the exact definition of the liability standard, rather 
than asking the courts to enforce a potentially inequitable 
rule (Mullins 1991). Therefore, due to the difficulty of 
determining who dumped what and how much decades ago, CERCLA 
has been favorably interpreted by the courts to maintain a 
powerful standard of liability (Bird 1993). The EPA and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) have sought favorable 
constructions of the statute in several areas. For example, 
the DOJ sought to establish a standard of strict and joint 
and several liability without a need to prove a nexus 
between a generator's waste disposed at a site and the 
subsequent release or threatened release that initiated the 
response action (Light 1990). 
In United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp, the court concluded 
that the deletion of the term "joint and several" from 
section 107 of CERCLA did not mean that the doctrine could 
never be imposed under the statute. The court stated that 
the standard of joint and several liability was possible if 
the harm was caused by two or more parties and if their 
respective contributions were indivisible, therefore 
difficult or impossible to apportion responsibility 
(Restatement (Second) of Torts 886A (1979), United States v. 
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. (S.D. Ohio 1983), Prager 1986-
1987, and Light 1990}.8 Moreover, in united States v.Wade 
the court interpreted section 107 not to require the 
government to prove any nexus between a generator's waste 
sent to a site and the spill or "release" that required the 
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response action (United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. (E.D. 
Pa. 1983) and Light 1990). These rulings significantly 
eased the plaintiff's burden of proof in Superfund cases. 
Divisibility of the Bara 
With the enactment of SARA, in 1986, the government 
asserted that small contributors could also be held jointly 
and severally liable for the full costs incurred during the 
response action. The government believed that SARA 
confirmed that factors such as the volume of waste sent to a 
site are relevant only in contribution actions, and should 
not be used to undercut joint and several liability in the 
initial allocation process (Light 1990). Therefore, the 
courts have routinely held PRPs jointly and severally liable 
unless one or more can establish the "divisibility" of its 
contribution (Hall et. ale 1994). However, in cases 
involving very small contributors, even when the harm is not 
easily divisible, some courts have found that apportionment 
is needed in order to ease the harshness of joint and 
several liability (United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 
F. Supp. (S.D. Ill. 1984), Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. 
Supp. (D. Idaho 1986), united States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 964 F.2d (1992), Garber 1987, and Harris and Milan 
1992). 
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Some courts have held that apportionment may be 
appropriate only when there is a "reasonable basis" for 
division of the harm (Restatement (Second) of Torts 886.A 
(1979), United States v. A&P Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 
(S.D. Ill. 1984), United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 
F.2d (1992), and Garber 1987)·. The A&F Materials court 
stated that in cases where "equitable factors" exist, such 
as volume, joint and several liability should not be 
implemented (United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. 
Supp. (S.D. Ill. 1984), Prager 1986-1987, and Light 1990). 
The Alcan court recognized that proving "divis.ibility" might 
also require an inventory of "the relative toxicity, 
migratory potential, and synergistic capacity of the 
hazardous waste at issue." (United States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 964 F.2d (1992) and Harris and Milan 1992}. 
In such cases the defendant carries the burden of 
demonstrating the divisibility of the harm (United States v. 
Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. (S.D. Ohio 1983), United 
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. (E.O. Pa. 1983), O'Neil v. 
Picillo, 833 F.2d (1990), United States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 964 F.2d (1992), Prager 1986-1987, Garber 1987, and 
Harris and Milan 1992). In instances where "divisibility" 
is proven the party would be held liable only for its 
contribution to the total harm caused (Garber 1987). 
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The Economic Efficiency of CERCLA Liability 
Public policy towards accidental external diseconomies 
such as pollution-engendered injuries have t basic. -,.-
ob '.ec.:tiyes: (I) efficient d.eterrens:e and (2) just 
~----.---- -....... ~ _."-" .. 
compensation or equity (Calabresi 196B). Using the status 
---.---~.~- "_. - ._. -' -- - .... _ ...... --",--
quo as a baseline the effici ency criterion weighs the 
expected marginal cost of pollution agains,t the marginal 
~------=----.- ----
cost of I?ollution control. Where the marginal costs are 
-...,..._ ..... -
equal, the cost of pollution-engendered accidents plus the 
cost of accident prevention is minimized {Coase 1960 and 
Katzman 1988}. The equity criterio _is--e-xp~s.ed--a.B-~e 
polluter pays principle- . {~atzan--19BB} • Under the polluter 
-----------------
pays principle, responsible parties are required to arrange 
for site cleanup as well as provide compensation to those 
who suffered from their actions. However, because victims 
of pollution are not in a market relationship with the 
polluter, payment by the polluter will occur only if the 
tort system compels it, or if a government entity (the EPA 
for example) imposes liability through direct regulation 
(Greve and Smith 1992). The idea is that injuries caused by 
such activities should not be allowed to fall uncompensated 
upon an innocent victim. 
The polluter pays principle is generally effective in 
environmental regulation because it allows externality costs 
to be "internalized" by the individual firm, thereby leading 
to socially responsible decisions (Tietenberg 1989). The 
polluter pays principle can be interpreted as an attempt to 
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invoke the benefits-received princi ple, whereby the cost of 
remediation should be paid by th.ose who benefitted from the 
less restrictive waste disposal practices of the past (Hird 
1993). However, the method of allocating direct cleanup 
costs to responsible parties through the imposition of joint 
and several liability may be difficult to support under a 
benefits-received criterion for allocating costs. 
Generally, the pollater pays principle works closely 
with the goal of economic efficiency. In order for economic 
efficiency to occur, firms and consumers must be forced to 
bear all the costs associated with the product,s that they 
produce or consume (Tietenberg 1989 and Probst et. ale 
1995). Therefore, the societal welfare is maximized when 
the price of a good accurately reflects its true cost as 
well as the degree of consumer demand for the product. 
Pollution engendered torts may possess several unique 
characteristics that undercut the use of conventional 
liability rules, such as multiple parties, multiple wastes, 
and high transaction costs (Coase 1960, Calabresi 1968, and 
Katzman 1988). Therefore, the use of direct regulation 
under CERCLA requires that the government promote a site 
remediation program based on a broad liability standard, 
enforce the liability standard, and arrange for the cleanup 
of the site in cases where responsible parties are unwilling 
to initiate the cleanup (Barnett 1994). Because the courts 
have interpreted CERCLA to maintain such a powerful standard 
of liability, it is very difficult to achieve economic 
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efficiency. Such an enforcement approach results in 
significant delays, high transaction costs, and the 
allocation of substantial cleanup costs. 
Delays 
An Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report notes 
that an average of 39 montbs pass between the site 
identification and the time a site reaches the NPL (OTA 
1988). Table I reflects the average time between the main 
steps in the Superfund process. These delays can be 
attributed to various factors, including the time spent 
negotiating and allocating liability under CERCLA. In most 
cases the process is impeded by the frequent difficulty of 
coordinating negotiations with multiple PRPs, each of which 
must agree on a remedial plan and allocation process {Bird 
1993}. As a result, significant delays occur at each phase 
of the process. These delays are often a direct result of 
litigation, or negotiation to avoid litigation, all of which 
are necessitated by the statutory framework (Bedeman et. ale 
1991). 
Transaction costs 
Transaction costs can be characterized as being a major 
expenditure that occurs throughout the. Superfund process. 9 
The costs are measurable in terms of dollars spent and 
cleanup delays. virtually all transaction costs relate to 
the search for parties that may contribute to site cleanup 
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costs, debating relative contributions, agreeing to a 
remediation plan, and developing a suitable allocation 
process (Hedeman et. ale 19~1).lo As a result, transaction 
costs typically increase in proportion to the time spent in 
negotiating these issues. 
The number of PRPs at a. site has a direct impact on 
transaction costs, even when other factors are constant. 
Due to the number of parties involved in the process the 
costs of devising a cleanup strategy and deciding financial 
responsibility for a clean.up often threaten to exceed the 
actual cleanup costs (Hird 1993). The transaction cost 
share is 34 percentage points lower at a single PRP site 
than at a multiple PRP site with the same characteristics. 
This suggests that transaction costs are significantly 
higher at multiple party sites than at single party sites. 
Therefore, the costs of communication and negotiation are 
expected to rise as the number of PRPs grows (Acton and 
Dixon 1992). 
Direct regulation under CERCLA is costly in terms of 
public expenditures on administration, staff, and general 
overhead costs. However, using joint and several liability 
the government can deal w'ith a smaller number of parties 
than if it had to recover cost contributions in proportion 
to waste contributions (Acton and Dixon 1992). The agency 
often focuses on only "deep pocket" PRPs in order to shift 
their overhead costs onto private parties. Therefore, 
public costs are often replaced by private party costs 
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(Acton and Dixon 1992, Church and Nakamura 1993, and Barnett 
1994). Transaction costs for private industry are generally 
higher than the EPA's because PRPs typically engage in both 
intra-PRP litigation, litigation with their insurers, and 
also litigation with state agencies and the DOJ (Hedeman et. 
ale 1991). 
Recent studies suggest that EPA's enforcement action 
costs account for an estimated 10 percent of total trust 
fund expenditures to date (Probst et. al. 1995:23). In 
contrast, transaction costs have been estimated to account 
for between 24 and 44 percent of the total expenditures 
incurred by private parties at a typical site (Butler 
1985:120). A recent Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
report estimated that 20 to 40 percent of total spending for 
the Superfund program is inefficient because of prolonged 
negotiations and litigations between the EPA and PRPs (OTA 
1989) • 
The Issue and Its Background 
Apportioning liability at a Superfund site can be 
characterized as a difficult, controversial, costly, and 
time consuming process. The allocation of cleanup costs is 
an inherently litigious issue because the relationship 
between responsibility and liability is often absent or, at 
best unclear. It is the doctrine of joint and several 
liability that ensures that a PRP's actual contribution to a 
site will most likely not play a significant role in the 
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allocation of their financia.l responsibilities (Bird 1993). 
The inability or failure to determine the waste 
contributions made by each party often results in the 
inequitable distribution of cleanup costs. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that CERCLA did not 
establish any explicit method for allocating financial 
responsibility in a given case. In fact, the Act provided 
very little guidance for parties looking for a way to 
structure an allocation proposal for settlement negotiations 
or judicial proceedings (Butler eta ale 1993). Therefore, 
both the courts and the agency have dev·eloped methods for 
allocating financial responsibility among PRPs. 
There are four bas' :-cost a]] ocation met.hods.-_used in 
(jJ 
Superfund situations. These methods allocate costs on the Q - -c:r: --------- --------
basis of volume, relative toxicl..ty, a combinatic:>I: _ c:>~. volume 
~~ --~o-xiCi t;~n~:;:~- ~qUi table fClG-tors, or stand-alC?ne 
- - ---
---
costs (Butler eta ale 1993). In most cases volume is the 
--primary factor taken into consideration by the courts, the 
EPA, and private negotiators in apportioning liability.ll 
However, in cases involving multiple parties various 
quantities and types of waste will have been contributed. 
Therefore, the courts have recognized that where a purely 
volume-based allocation would be inequitable, because one 
party's waste is significantly different than another 
party's, other factors must be considered. As a result, 
allocations methods are increasingly focusing on whose waste 
stream is responsible for which associated costs (Hall eta 
-----_. -- ~-----
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ale 1994). 
Allocations Based on Relative Volume 
This approach is simple, understandable, and cost 
effective given the right circumstances. Volumetric 
apportionment _qnir.:e.s \:1se-o.f-!!.was:te- i n-lis..ts" • The 
waste-in-lists are comprised of information relative to the 
quantity and type of waste present at a site. This 
information is normally gathered during the general 
information search under Section 104(e), therefore collected 
regardless of whether or not a waste-in-list is performed 
(Hall et. ale 1994:1497). The information is obtained from 
records maintained by site operators, transporters, 
generators, state records, and on-site inventories. 
Apportionment is made on the basis of relative volumes 
shipped by each PRP, or on the proportionate volume disposed 
of at the site by each PRP (Hedeman et. ale 1991, Butler et. 
ale 1993, and Hall et. ale 1994). 
One major factor that complicates allDcations using the 
volumetric approach is incomplete or missing data. Many 
Superfund sites are abandoned ones, therefore, companies 
will have little or no data on the amount of waste shipped 
to or disposed of at the site. These circumstances often 
~---. - _ .. 
result in the need for arbitraz;y d.~.£!§.iO.nB-_to......be-lIlade _due to 
the lack of sufficient data required to complete the ~aste-
---
in-list (Hedeman et. ale 1991). Furthermore, using volume 
as the primary decision factor, many assumptions may need to 
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be made in relation to the specific conditions of a site 
(Butler et. al. 1993). 
Even if a reliable waste-in-list can be prepared the 
use of the volumetric approach is plagued by other inherent 
problems. The approach violates the cost causation 
principle by allocating volumes without regard to directly 
attributable costs. 12 Furthermore, some key a.ssumptions 
must be made in order to implement the volumetric approach. 
Wastes must be considered to be homogenous, therefore, the 
approach does not distinguish between hazardous and non 
- ---- ---.---. 
hazardous wastes or the different cleanup costs associated 
----- .. --_. 
with each. Also, depending on what units volume is measured 
----in (gallons, cubic yards, number of drums, etc.) may 
directly affect _the cost allocatiqn (Butler et. ale 
1993:10139). 
Allocations Based OD Rela~ive Toxicity 
Use of the relative toxicity approach generally 
requires that wastes to be cleaned up or treated be placed 
into groups of wastes with similar toxicity. A toxicity 
score is then developed for each group. The volume of each 
waste group is then multiplied by its toxicity score in 
order to obtain a toxic equivalent volume. Finally, the 
ratio of each PRP's toxic equivalent volume to the total 
toxic equivalent volume of all the representative wastes at 
the site constitutes its cost allocation share. Therefore, 
this approach does account for the higher cost shares 
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1 
/ 
associated with highly toxic wastes and the lower cost 
shares associated with less-toxic wastes, all things 
remaining equal (Butler et. ale 1993). 
Once again this is a process that requires a 
substantial amount of information and data, therefore, an 
arbitrary decision(s) may need to be made in order to 
facilitate the final allocation. Due to the heterogeneity 
of the wastes contributed by each party (specifically 
generators), individual parties may need to provide detailed 
information on the composition and quantity of wastes sent 
to the site (Butler et. a1. 1993). Therefore, the inherent 
lack of valid information common to many Superfund sites 
remains a logistical problem. Moreover, due to the detailed 
information required to perform such an allocation, PRPs may 
be unwilling (especially at early negotiation stages) to 
share such data with government agencies or other parties 
(Hedeman et. a1. 1991). Furthermore, this allocation method 
is typically more costly than the volumetric approach 
(Butler et. ale 1993). 
Allocations Based on stand-Alone Costs (SAC) 
The SAC method is an approach that has historicaJ.ly .. 
-- --._--_ ... 
~. uEied in the:_ <:iist;.~.:i.J;Lut.ion . of Gosts - for. w.ater. res.ource 
projects. 
~
The method is based on the ide that fairness 
----
re uire.s the mem1?~rs of a mUlti-purpose project ~_q .pay !!l 
proportion to the ~en~f~t~ they receive (Butler et. ale 
~....:;;... __ .. _---_w .. ---.- .--.,.........:::--__ ,. ..... '. _ .... _. _ ..... 
1993: 10141). The stand-alone cost (S~~.L _IDethod begins by 
--. -- _ ... - .- .- .. _., 
------
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allocating allY_ide. tifiab . i.Lec..t cleanup costs to t 
'---------'-- ' 
responsible parti~s. Fo11owing this initial allocation, the 
common costs would be allocated according to the relative 
- --------_. -- -----~ 
costs of cleaning up each PRPs cont~ib~t~n as if it was the 
- .... - - ....... ~. ---- - --------.-- _ .. -- -- -. -
only waste at the site. 
-.-- -- --.---- ~ .. - .- -. -- .-
This approach can be mathematically expressed by the 
following: 
N 
f;l SAC i (1 ) 
Where: 
SAC i =the stand-alone cost for PRP i (or PRPgroup i) 
N =the total number of PRPs (or PRP groups) 
L =the sum of all SAC i terms 
This calculated share of the common co~ts is multiplied by 
-- - .. -. -- .. -- .----------.~ ----.--... --.-----'~- . 
the total common costs ass~ciated wit~ . ~~~ cleanpp effort ~o 
arrive at the share of cammon. costs allocated to each PRP or 
-.------ -- " - - -'- .---- - . 
PRP group (Butler et. al. 1993:10141). 
Allocating Superfund remediation costs based on the SAC 
method derives from the concept of economies of scope. 13 
The economies of scope at a Superfund site occur when the 
cost per cubic yard to treat a large volume of waste is less 
than the cost per cubic yard to treat a small volume of 
waste (Butler et. al. 1993:10142).14 Theoretically a party 
would realize significant savings by participating in a 
joint cleanup effort, rather than acting alone. One 
-
disadvantage of the SAC methad-i-s that the cost of 
implementing the approacb increases as the number of PRP 
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groups increase due to the additional number of SAC options 
that must be calculated (Butler et. ale 1993:10143). 
Judicial Guidance on ~ J!!!B,o~!!y j 
Detailing the contribution of each PRP would be a 
lengthy, expensive, and an almost ~im~~===-~~. Often it 
is diffic I t-t.G-eie'&e-rmine who dumped what and l!ow _J!l~.£lL- In 
-- -~'- ----
many cases generator and transporter records of the types 
and quantities of wastes sent to a given site are many times 
incomplete or completely missing, making it difficult to 
apportion liability on anything but an arbitrary basis 
(Light 1990 and Mason 1991). Therefore, the courts are more 
likely to impose joint and several liability on PRPs rather ~ 
-~:.-'::""--~--.- ._-- -------- - ------_.-
than to ~~empt to divide response _costs among multiple PRPs 
-- --------------------
for various reasons (Mason 1991 and Bird 1993). 
The allocation issue typically arises at two stages 
under CERCLA: the initial respo~ stage and the 
contribution S!Ag~.15 In the initial allocation stage a 
...------------ ---- .---
court must determine a party's responsibility according to 
the principles of joint and several liability. In contrast, 
the contribution stage involves the use of various 
"equitable factors" to be considered by the courts (Mason 
1991). The problem faced by the courts is that Congress 
failed to suggest how they were to apportion liability in a 
given case (Garber 1987). Therefore, the courts have 
traditionally applied the strict and joint and several 
liability standard on a case-by-case basis. As a result, 
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two methods of application have evolved: (1) the majority, 
strict "restatement" approach; and (2) the minority, 
"moderate" approach (Restatement (Second) of Torts 886A 
(1979), United States v. Cbem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. (S.D. 
Ohio 1983), United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 
(S.D. Ill. 1984), Light 1990, and Mason 1991). 
The Restatement Approach 
Under the Restatement approach (using sections 433A, 
875, and 881 of the Second Restatement of Torts), once a 
group of PRPs is found liable under CERCLA, the court may 
choose to impose joint and several liability, holding each 
PRP individually liable for the total costs of the response 
action (Mason 1991, Light 1990, and United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. (S.D. Ohio 1983). Therefore, a 
court will impose joint and several liability when faced 
with joined parties that have created a single and 
indivisible harm (United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. 
Supp. (S.D. Ohio 1983), United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 
(E.D. Mo. 1987), Mason 1991, and Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (1979». 
However, under sections 433A and 881 of the 
Restatement, a court may choose to apportion liability where 
joined parties acting independently have combined to create 
a single harm. Under such a situation each party is liable 
only for its part of the harm (United States v. Chem-Dyne 
Corp., 572 F. Supp. (S.D. Ohio 1983), United States v. 
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Monsanto, 858 F.2d (4th Circuit 1988), and Mason 1991). 
Such an apportionment is appropriate only when the court can 
distinguish the causes from one another or find some other 
reasonable basis for determining how much harm eacb party 
contributed to the total barm (Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1979), and Mason 1991). 
The Moderate Approach 
Once a court has established the initial divisibility 
or indivisibility of the harm, then any of the identified 
PRPs may try to limit its costs by seeking contribution from 
fellow PRPs. Section 11J(f)(1) of SARA provides that a 
court may allocate response costs among liable parties using 
such "equitable factors as the court determines are 
appropriate" (42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) 1988 and Mason 1991). 
However, Section 113(f){l} of SARA fails to suggest what 
"equitable factors" may be used in addressing the 
apportionment issue (Garber 1987, Mason 1991, and Hall et 
al. 1994). Moreover, the equitable factors' standard offers 
little guidance as to the proper distribution of liability 
among the responsible parties (Burt and Sanoff 1990:204). 
The moderate approach follows a set of important 
"equitable factors" taken from a proposed amendment (the 
Gore amendment) to CERCLA that was eventually dismissed 
(Mason 1991). Therefore, when a court is confronted with a 
contribution case, it may choose to apportion liability 
according to the following equitable factors: (1) the PRPs 
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ability to prove that it's contribution was distinguishable 
from that of other PRPsi (2) the amount of hazardous waste 
attributable to the PRPi (3) the toxicity of that waste; (4) 
the PRPs involvement in the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, or disposal of the waste; (5) the degree 
of care that the PRP exercised in those activities; and (6) 
the extent to which the PRP cooperated with government 
officials in preventing further harm (United States v. A&F 
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. (S.D. Ill. 1984), Amoco Oil 
Company v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d (5th Circuit 1989), Mason 
1991, Prager 1986-1987, and Hall et. ale 1994). 
Apparently Congress did not want to limit the factors 
the courts could consider. Therefore, the equitable 
factors' standard has given the courts a wide base for 
making decisions concerning what constitutes a fair 
allocation. The courts have adopted other equitable 
factors. They include: (1) existing contracts between the 
parties on the subject of liability; (2) the owner's 
involvement in the operator's activities and operations; (3) 
benefit received by the owner from the operator's 
activities; and (4) benefit of the owner if after the 
cleanup the land is cleaner than at the outset of the 
operation that caused the harm (Burt and Sanoff 1990 and 
Hall et. ale 1994). 
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EPA Guidance on Allocating Responsibility 
The broad CERCLA settlement policy provided little 
.guidance on allocating responsibility and as a result, the 
EPA has had little experience in th.e area (Butler et. ale 
1993). Generally, the agency has left the PRPs to resolve 
the allocation issue on their own. 16 However, the agency 
does provide a few alternatives for allocating 
~~ 
responsibility among the PRPs: (1) the tiered approach; (2) 
----the preparation of NBARs; and (3) the formal organization of 
PRPs. 
The preparation of H8ARs 
The reauthorization of Superfund, in 1986, provided the 
agency with some guidance in the area of allocating response 
costs among PRPs. Section 122(e)(3) of SARA authorizes the 
agency to develop guidelines for preparing nonbinding 
allocations of responsibility (NBARS) and waste-in-lists (42 
U.S.C. 9622(e)(3) (1988». However, the EPA has utilized 
these settlement alternatives offered by SARA in only a 
limited number of cases. 
To prepare an NBAR, the agency must divide one-hundred 
percent of the liability at a site among the waste generator 
PRPs (according to volume) (42 U.S.C. 9622(e)(3) (1988), 
Mason 1991, and Hall et. ale 1994). The EPA uses the volume 
of waste that each PRP contributed to a site as the 
threshold criterion for apportioning liability under an 
NBAR. However, the EPA has acknowledged that factors such 
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as volume, toxicity, mobility, ability to pay, litigative 
risks in trying the case, and evidence tracing wastes at a 
site to a specific PRP(s) may be used in order to allocate 
cleanup costs (Hall et. al. 1994). Section 104(e) allows 
the EPA to obtain information from a PRP on: (1) the nature 
and quantity of hazardous waste generated, treated, stored 
or disposed of at a site~ (2) nature or extent of a release; 
and (3) ability to pay (42 U.S.C. 9604(e) (1988) and Hall 
et. al .. 1994). 
The EPA may then adjust the allocations using the 
following criteria: (I) the evidence linking wastes at the 
site to specific PRPSi (2) ability to pay; (3) the risks of 
litigation; (4) public interest considerations; (5) the 
precedential value of the case if it were to go to court; 
(5) the value of getting a fixed monetary settlement; (6) 
inequities and aggravating factors; and (7) the nature of 
the case that will remain after settlement. The agency must 
allocate shares of liability to the nongenerator PRPs based 
primarily on the degree of culpability, and transporters 
according to volume, packaging, and placement of the wastes 
at the site (42 U.S.C. 9622(e)(3) (1988), Mason 1991, and 
Hall et. al .. 1994). 
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The Tiered Approach 
When there are a significant number of PRPs at a site, 
the EPA typically divides them into groups of defendants 
known as tiers. These tiers are based primarily on each 
PRP's site specific criteria and financial viability (Acton 
and Dixon 1992). Using the Tiered approach PRPs are divided 
into subgroups that represent specific site conditions. 
Tier I defendants generally consist of PRPs with the largest 
volumetric shares or largest assets. Tier II and Tier III 
PRPs usually constitute smaller volumetric shares or 
financial assets. The EPA typically focuses exclusively on 
the Tier I defendants, leaving it to the Tier I PRPs to 
pursue the PRPs in the lower tiers. However, in some 
instances the agency will enter into serious negotiations 
with Tier II and Tier III PRPs if negotiations become 
finalized with Tier I PRPs (Acton and Dixon 1992:10). 
The Formal Organization of PRPs 
When a substantial number of PRPs are identified, the 
EPA encourages the parties to form PRP organizations. These 
organizations or PRP groups often create a steering 
committee. This committee is usually responsible for 
directing all negotiation and settlement activities, 
directing the activities of hired consultants and common 
counsel, appointing members of other sub-committees, as well 
as recommending cost allocation methods {Hedeman et. al. 
1991:10418).17 Figure 5 summarizes the organizational 
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structure and function of the steering committee. The 
creation and maintenance of a PRP organization often entails 
substantial costs. These costs are generally allocated 
through non-binding structures that consist of distinct 
tiers of contribution (Ha11 et. al. 1994:1492). 
Additional committees are generally formed, including 
an allocation committee. The purpose of the ,allocation 
committee is to recommend a method for apportioning the 
response costs among the group (Hedeman et. al. 1991:10418). 
The cost allocations are most often based on volumetric 
contributions because this information is generally the most 
readily available. However, the actual allocation will vary 
significantly depending on the site conditions, relative 
facts, and the resources of various parties (Hall et. al. 
1994:1492). 
Chapter Summary 
It would appear that the basic goals of Superfund are 
hindered by the interpretation and implementation of its own 
liability scheme. The use of such a comprehensive liability 
standard often prevents the timely cleanup of sites. Even 
when the EPA seeks settlements or cost recoveries from one 
or a few large PRPs, these parties often sue other PRPs in 
hopes of recovering their incurred costs. Therefore, 
although government transaction costs may be reduced by 
concentrating on larger PRPs, they are frequently replaced 
by private transaction costs. The process is further 
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hindered by the frequent dif'fi.cul ty of coordinating 
negotiations with multiple PRPs, each of which must agree on 
a remedial plan and a cost allocation method (Bird 1993). 
The CERCLA liability scheme creates complex and 
practical problems for parties attempting to allocate 
financial responsibility_ Many of the cost allocation 
methods commonly used lack logical foundations. The lack of 
techniques based on accepted principles inevitably leads to 
continued debating among PRPs, ultimately resulting in 
significant delays and excessive costs. 
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Chapter Hotes 
1. The third defense is only available if a PRP can 
prove that it exercised due care and took reasonable 
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any 
such third party. See Mason 1991:82. 
2. No joined party aay bring a contribution claim if it 
is found that the party intentionally caused the harm for 
which it is liable. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 886A 
(1979). 
3. Removal actions are typically short-term actions 
taken to address an immediate threat to the human health and 
the environment. Remedial actions are generally long-term 
actions that are intended to provide a permanent remedy to 
the threatened release or release. 
4. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) establishes 
standards for the assessment of cleanup actions. Any 
response action taken by either a public or private entity 
must be consistent with the NCP. See Pusch 1991:217. 
5. This number apparently has no intrinsic value and 
was initially chosen simply to ensure that at least 400 
sites nationwide made the NPL. 
6. In a "fund-Iead w cleanup, the EPA will hire 
contractors to evaluate potential remedies. The agency will 
then perform the cleanup and bring suit against PRPs to 
recover response costs that were incurred. In an 
"enforcement-lead" cleanup, the EPA issues an order or sues 
the PRPs, forcing the PRPs to conduct the necessary response 
action, with the agency maintaining a supervisory role. See 
Hedeman et. ale 1991:10416. 
7. Such PRPs are generally referred to as "deep 
pockets". They are usually characterized as parties with 
substantial financial assets. 
8. The court took a common law approach in the case, 
stating that the term "joint and several" had been omitted 
from the final bill in order for the courts to determine the 
use of joint and several liability on a case by case basis. 
However, the court failed to adopt the blanket liability 
scheme of the Clean Water Act. See United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. supp. (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
9. Transaction costs are generally those overhead costs 
associated with consultant fees, legal, and administrative 
costs. 
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10. In identifying fewer than all the PRPs, the agency 
incurs substantial upfront costs. However, the responding 
PRPs generally incur more costs on attorney and consultant 
fees in order to identify other PRPs. See Hedeman et. ale 
1991:10414. 
11. Other factors to be considered could included 
toxicity, migratory potential, and ability to pay. 
12. The volumetric approach fails to take into account 
directly attributable costs that may cause the cost of the 
cleanup to change significantly. 
13. The stand-alone cost of a cleanup effort is similar 
to the cost of producing a single product or service 
separately from, rather than in combination with, other 
products or services. See Butler et. ale 1993:10142. 
14. Such economies of scope would arise when the 
toxicity associated with the larger contribution is less 
than the toxicity associated with the smaller contribution. 
Therefore, the treatment of the smaller contribution would 
drive the remediation costs. 
15. The allocation stage typically follows a government 
cost recovery action, while the contribution stage occurs 
when a PRP{S) brings a contribution claim against a fellow 
PRP(s). See united States v. western Processing Co., 734 F. 
Supp. (W.O. Wash. 1990). 
16. The agency usually recommends that the PRPs resolve 
the allocation issue through the use of a PRP allocation 
committee (entity of the steering committee) or the 
assistance of an outside consultant. See Butler et. ale 
1993:10134. 
17. Numerous sub-committees are generally formed: an 
executive committee to handle administrative and financial 
matters; a technical committee to oversee technical 
consultants and negotiate technical issues with the 
government; an allocation committee to recommend a method 
for allocating costs among the parties; and a de minimis 
committee to recommend the terms of a de minimis settlement, 
if applicable. See Hedeman et. ale 1991:10418 and Figure 5. 
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FIGURE 1: Overview ·of the Removal Action Process. 
Notification or 
Discovery 
! 
Conduct Removal 
Site Evaluation 
(RSE) 
! Does Bot Meet 
Assess RSE results Criteria End response or 
against removal refer to remedial 
action criteria in State program 
NCP (if appropriate) 
I Meets Criteria 
Obtain approval for 
removal action 
I 
*Initiate site 
action 
! 
*Oversee cleanup 
contractors 
I 
*Action completed *Public Participat' ~on 
Source: EPA 1991:6 (slightly modified). 
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Figure 2: Overview of the Remedial Action Process • 
.J-I .; 1 
Raaedial IDv •• tigation (RI) 
An assessment of the nature and 
extent of contamination and the 
associated risks 
Peasibili.tJ Study (PS) 
Development aDd analysis of the 
range of cleauup alternatives for 
the aite 
I 
Selection of Remedy 
Selection of the remedial 
alternative for the site includes: 
Proposed Plan 
Identifiee the remedial 
alternative likely to be chosen 
and explains why and allows for 
public comment 
Record of Decision (ROD) 
The official report documenting 
background information on the site 
and describiug the chosen remedy 
J 
Remedial Design (RD) 
Preparation of: technical plans and 
specifications for implementing 
the chosen remedial alternative 
I 
Remedial Action (RA) 
Construction or other work 
necessary to implement the 
remedial alternative 
I 
Operation , Maintenance (O'M) 
Activities conducted at a site 
after a response action occurs to 
ensure that the cleanup methods 
are working properly and to ensure 
site remediation is effective 
Source: EPA 1991:14 (slightly modified). 
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TABLE I: Times for Sites to Reach Points in the Superfund 
Process. 
Average 
From entry into Superfund until: 
PA complet ion ............................................................... 18 
Site Inspection completion •••••••••••••••.•••.••••••• 21 
Placement on NPL ..................................................................... 36 
Start of RI /FS •••..••••••••••••.•••••••••.•••..•••••• 44 
Completion of RI /FS •••••••••••••••••••.••.•.••.•••••. 75 
Signing of ROD •••••••••••••••••.•.•••••••.••••.••••.• 81 
Completion of ROD remedy •••••••••••.•••.•..••..•••••• 10 
Between PA completion until: 
Site Inspection •.•••••••••••••••..•••••••.•••..••••.• 14 
PlaceIU.ent on NPL ...................................................................... 32 
Start of RIfFS ............................................................................. 42 
Between placement on NPL and RI/FS •.••••••••••...••.... 16 
Duration of RIfFS: 
Studies ......................................................................................... 32 
Total period {studies through ROD) ••••••..•...•••••.. 34 
months 
months 
months 
months 
months 
months 
years 
months 
month,s 
months 
months 
months 
months 
Range 
1-45 
1-44 
4-75 
20-68 
47-103 
50-104 
6-20 
0-39 
3-73 
13-68 
3-39 
21-38 
24-39 
Signing of ROD and ROD estimated completion of RA .••... 38 months 20-120 
Duration of public comment peri od .•••••••.•..••••..•... 33 days 24-44 
Time between end of public coument period and 
signing of ROD •.••.••••••••••••...••.••..•••.••••.•.. 34 days 15-122 
Source: OTA 1988:13 (slightly modified). 
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FIGURE 3: Overview of the Superfund Process. 
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Source: Hedeman et. ale 1991:10416. 
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FIGURE 4: The Basic Superfund Enforcement Process. 
Initiate Issue General E.xchange Issue Special 
PRP Search Notice Letter t-- Information t-- Notice Letter ~ 
Negotiate Negotiations 1'8. PRP -AOC 
'-- Settlement Successful? \ Response -Consent Decre e 
-RI/FS 
I Bo 
Negotiations Issue H ~ PRP with a 60-90 UAO Compliance? Response Day Response 
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Source: EPA 1991:23 (slightly modified). 
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FIGURE 5: The Steering Committee Structure. 
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Source: Hedeman et. ale 1991:10418. 
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I 
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-evaluates 
de minimis 
settlement 
eligibility 
-recommends 
terms of de 
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CHAPTER III 
COST ALLOCATIOH PRIRCIPLES: DEVELOPING A MODEL 
~ 
A successful cost allocation generally involves 
iden t ify ing a .....:t~o:::..t!:.:a~-'"' ........ l..Joo to be allocated, followed by 
implementation of a cost allocation method. Once the 
relevant information is agreed upon, a cost allocation 
method must be selected. The allocation method must be 
consistent and reflect the nature of the costs that are to 
be allocated (Biddle and Steinberg 1984). Therefore, the 
usefulness of the allocation _will depend upon the n~ of 
the cost being allocated, the allocation method chosen, and 
the decisions to be based on the allocated costs (Biddle and 
Steinberg 1984). 
In general, an apportionment problem arises whenever a 
set of similar, indivisible objects must be distributed 
among a group of claimants in proportion to their claims 
(Young 1994:43). Traditionally, joint cost allocations have 
been based on information regarding either (1) physical 
proxies for benefits received from joint factors; or (2) the 
ability to pay. These physical proxies may include units of 
production, volumes, lengths, weights and heat contents 
(Biddle and Steinberg 1984:11). Historically, joint cost 
settings occur when production costs are a nonseparable 
function of the outputs of two or more products. In some 
instances, physical proxies such as volume and toxicity may 
be an inadequate basis for allocating financial 
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responsibility under CERCLA. Disputes often arise between 
parties concerning their relative contributions and their 
associated cleanup costs,. As a result of these pitfalls, 
there has been some discussion on the appropriate rules for 
allocating joint costs under Superfund. 
Discussions on the appropriate rules for allocating 
cleanup costs under Su.perfund have lead to several 
conclusions. First, a party or class of parties should bear 
only those costs that can be directly attributed to them. 
In Superfund cost allocations it is viewed as equitable and 
economically efficient that costs that can be directly 
traced to the actions of specific party should be paid by 
that party (Butler et. ale 1993: 10138).1 Secondly, any 
costs that cannot be directly traced to a party or class of 
parties should not be borne by that party or class based on 
cost causation (cause and effect) (Butler et. ale 
1993:10138).2 These costs are considered to be a 
nonseparable function of the outputs of two or more products 
or, in the case of Superfund, two or more parties. Such 
costs cannot be logically apportioned to any single party 
(Biddle and Steinberg 1984 and Butler et. ale 1993). 
The non separability of the cost function and the joint 
production of the products reflect cost savings or economies 
of scope. Economies of scope arise when it is less costly 
to jointly produce a set of products. 3 The costs associated 
with jointly producing a product are known as common costs. 
Common costs apply to a setting in which the production 
50 
I" 
costs are based on a single service which is used by two or 
more users (Biddle and Steinberg 1984:4-5).4 In the context 
of Superfund, common costs are the nonseparable c,osts that 
cannot be allocated to any s.ingle party on the basis of cost 
causation (cause and effect).' 
Generally, joint cost allocations emphasize output 
decision incentives, where.as common cost allocations 
emphasize incentives to po.tential users to participate in 
the common provision of a product or service (Biddle and 
Steinberg 1984:5). It follows that common production is 
undertaken in order to realize the cost savings related to 
economies of scope. However, these cost savings will 'not be 
realized unless parties agree to voluntarily participate in 
a coalition (Biddle and Steinberg 1984:16). Therefore, a 
party must choose between acting independently and 
participating in a joint project, such a decision should be 
made by comparing the cost of each. 6 
The Formation of Cooperative Coalitions 
The decision to participate in a coalition will be made 
only if a party's cost as a member of the coalition is lower 
" than the cost of acting independently (Faulhaber 1975:966). 
The decision to participate can be "systematically analyzed 
by applying cooperative game theory" pr~nciples (Lejano and 
Davos 1995:1387). When allocating costs among a group of 
parties, some sense of fairness must exist in order for 
there to be agreement among the project members. Concepts 
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from cooperative gam.e theory are often used to apportion 
costs among project participants in a fai~ manner (Loehman 
and Whinston 1975:87). Cooperative game theory analyzes a r 
joint cost project as a ..game with N players, each of which 
can choose among the following: (1) acting independently; 
(2) joining the grand coalition of all N players; or (3) 
forming a coalition with only a sub-set (5) of the N players 
(Lejano and Davos 1995:1387). 
Games in which a coalition seeks to minimize costs are 
known as cost games. Cost games can be converted to savings 
games by measuring savings relative to the costs of not 
. 
participating in a coalition (Heaney and Dickinson 1982). 
Cost games are subadditive; that is: 
C(s) + c(T) ~ c(s U T) for S n T = ~ S, TeN (2) 
Where ~ is the empty set and (5) and (T) are any two subsets 
of N. Satisfaction of subadditivity is a requirement for 
voluntary cooperation. If it is not met, then at least one 
coalition exists for which costs would be lower if the 
members did not form the coalition. However, this is not 
possible if the least-cost solution has been found for each 
coalition. At worst, no lower cost would occur when the 
coalition forms, such a condition is said to be inessential 
(Heaney and Dickinson 1982:477). 
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Game theorists have established three general axioms, 
which a fair solution to a cost game should satisfy. 
the cost assigned to the i U group, x(i), should be less 
than or equal to its cost of acting independently; 
x(i) ::5 c(i) '1i £ N ( 3 ) 
e ng) the total cost, C{N), must be all~cate~~~~ng the 
groups; 
L xCi) = c(N) 
iEN 
.-,...-- , 
( 4 ) 
"c:." 
I Finally', the cost allocated to the members ·of any sub-group 
" "-. :or 
(8) should be less than, or equal to the costs that the sub-
group will incur by acting independently from the other 
members of the grand coalition N; 
L xCi) ::5 c(S) 
iEN 
'15 e N 
(Heaney and Dickinson 1982:478 and Lejano and Dickinson 
1995:1388). Any solution(s) satisfying the first two 
(5 ) 
criteria are referred to as imputations. Any solution(s) 
satisfying all three criteria will constitute the core of 
the game. 7 A cost game has a convex core if: 
--_. 
c(S) + c(T) ~ c(SUT) + C(snT) snT - ) ~ S, TeN ( 6 ) 
Therefore, an allocation is in the core of the cost-sharing 
game if no participant, or group of participants, pays more 
than its cost of acting alone (Young 1994:85). As a result, 
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the more attractive (less costly) the game, the more likely 
that the core is convex. On the other hand, the less 
attractive (more costly) the ClJame, the more likely the core 
is empty (Heaney and Dickinson 1982:478). 
If these conditions are not met there will be an 
incentive for some participants to leave the grand coalition 
in order to act independently or carry out their own joint 
project (Lejano and Davos 1995:1388). Therefore, if the 
cost allocation results in a charge that is more than the 
avoided or stand-alone cost (SAC) of any participant, the 
party or parties that are charged more will go at it alone 
and the economic efficiency of a joint cleanup effort will 
be lost (Butler et. al. 1993:10143). The importance of 
these issues lies in the fact that if the cost is too high 
there will be disincentives to participate, while if charges 
are too low, the total costs will not be covered {Loehman 
and Whinston 1975}. 
Concepts from cooperative game theory provide a logical 
and straightforward approach to the allocation of 
nonseparable costs among PRP groups. cooperative game 
theory considers problems of fairness and equity in 
allocating costs among meniliers of a group who voluntarily 
agree to cooperate, the focus is on ensuring the parties 
cooperation (Biddle and Steinberg 1984:16). In order to 
,..--- -
ensure that a coalition or sub-coalition is formed, it is 
necessary to ensure the following: (1) identification~d_ 
allocation of each party's (separable cost~'\ (2) incentives 
~--- -- ---- - ---- .. ------------ -- \, .. --_'_'- --- .--- ;/ 
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for participation; and (3l the division of the perspective 
participants into PRP classes that are manageable. Once 
these conditions have been met the allocation committee, or 
i vr" entity, can identify coalitions or sub-coalitions and begin 
the process of implementing 'the proposed allocation method. 
~:ntifYiP9 Each PRP's Separable Costs 
" / 
Separabl ..QQS.ts are defined as the difference between 
the cost of the coalitioD project and the cost of the 
project with the coalition omitted. They include direct J 
costs and the incremental costs of changing the size ofihe 
-----~- -
coalition's cost elements. Calculatin the separable costs 
for each PRP provides the following information: (1) it 
provides the allocation committee or entity with the 
necessary information for identif each party's directly 
attributable cleanup cost, and (2) it helps each party 
----------.---.. --..--... --........ ~-.... -. 
determine the feasibility of acting independently or 
participating in the coalition. Separable costs can be 
expressed mathematically by: 
--. -- ---_.- . ----
sc(i) = C(N} - C[(N) - {ill Vi E. N (7) 
Where: 
sc(i} 
C{N) 
c[ (N}-{i} 1 
=separable cost to PRP i (or PRP group i) 
=total cost for the grand coalition of n 
groups 
=total cost for the grand coalition 
with PRP i (or PRP group i excluded) 
( b.;'.l.k,,,- ) 
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J 
Assuming that each_ roup bas been allocated its separable 
--. -_ .... _- ... ,-_ ..... _...-... ............. -. 
costs, the remainin costs to be assigned are called 
-
nonseparabl~cos.t-fL...PISC) (Heaney and Dickinson 1982:477). 
---
By allocating directly attributable cleanup costs, any 
attempt to allocate project costs based on cost causation is 
avoided. 
Incentives for Joining A Coalition 
Due to the nature of Superfund liability and the 
pitfalls of current allocation methods, there are 
significant incentives for the various parties to undertake 
a joint cleanup effort. Most significant among these 
incentives is the economic efficiency that can be attained 
because of economies of scope or commonality of interests 
(Lejano and Davos 1995:1387).8 The obvious incentive is the 
aversion of joint and several liability and the possibility 
of bearing the full cost of the cleanup. Whether or not a 
party will respond favorably to these incentives and choose 
to participate in a joint cleanup effort will depend on its 
anticipated savings. 
A PRP would presumedly compare the expected benefits 
------_ .. __ . '~.~- .. 
and costs of acting independently, with those of 
-- - .. ~ .. -.-~.----
participating in a coalition or sub-coalition. Therefore, a 
PRP would not participate in a coalition or sub-coalition if 
the expected cost of participating is greater than the 
expected cost of taking an independent action. This 
decision would be based on the calculated costs generated 
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from equations (3) a,nd (5 ) . Therefore, it is important for 
the entity performing the allocation (preferably a neutral 
third party) to quickly identify each party's separable cost 
and establish an estimated cleanup cost. This cost will 
serve as the baseline for comparing the cost savings among a 
party's possible alternati ves. 
The incentives for participating in a 'coalition should 
be obvious to a PRP(s). Under the doctrine of joint and 
sev,eral liability, a PRP(s) could risk bearing the full cost 
of cleaning up a site if the decision is made to litigate 
the matter or if they choose not to respond. In most cases 
the size and financial assets of a PRP are likely to 
influence a firm's decision to litigate or negotiate a 
settlement with the EPA or fellow PRPs.~ Generally, a 
negotiated settlement will result in a total cost that is 
substantially less than any settlement that may be obtained 
in court (Acton and Dixon 1992 and Probst et. ale 1995). 
Moreover, the opportunity to join a coalition would 
generally offer the PRP a reduction in overall costs. 
I' 
Dividing Coalition participants Into Discernible Classes 
The presence of multiple PRPs generally creates 
heterogeneity among PRPs. Differences usually exist between 
PRPs in the type and quantity of waste contributed at the 
site, whether or not they have been named by the EPA, 
financial viability, and their general attitude toward the 
Superfund process. Any apportionment of responsibility 
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involves allocation not only among the various classes of 
PRPs but also within each of those classes (Burt and Sanoff 
1990: 203) • Therefore, in most case.s it is beneficial to 
group PRPs into similar classes, based on the information 
gathered during the initial investigation. 1o These groups 
or classes are generally comprised of generator or 
transporter status PRPs, based on their involvement at the 
site. This c1assificatioQjLy$tem serves three im or~ant 
functions: (1) it divides the PRPs into manageable and we~-
__ • ·.w __ "_ 
defined units; (2) it provides a quick and easy way to 
- ----- - ---
determine directly attributable shares; and (3) it ensures 
that similar parties are allocated similar costs. 
~ -" 
The Role of the Minimum Cost ~e~iD;n9 ~~viDgs (MCRS) Method 
--------- . 
The purpose of this study is to develop an allocation 
method that effectively and efficiently allocates cleanup 
costs among multiple parties. The proposed model is based 
on the minimization of costs through cooperative 
participation. Therefo.re, the proposed allocation method 
incorporates the use of the minimum costs remaining savings 
(MCRS) method as a means of apportioning cleanup costs among 
a coalition of PRPs. The MCRS cost allocation method 
provides incentives for participating in a coalition by 
minimizing individual cost and maximizing individual savings 
(Heaney and Dickinson 1982). 
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The overall idea is to delineate the boundaries of the 
core. Using a game theory approach, the boundaries of the 
core would be delimited. Then the minimum and maximum 
feasible costs for each participant are calculated. The 
minimum feasible costs correspond to the separable costs, 
while the remaining costs are prorated based on the 
difference between the participant's feasible maximum and 
minimum costs and the total difference (Heaney and Dickinson 
1982:481). Therefore, for games with a core, the upper and 
lower bounds on each x(i) can be found by solving the 
following linear program: 
max or min: xCi) 
subject to: x(i) :5 c(i} 'Vi E.. N 
L x(i) :5 c(s) 'Vs E.. N ( B ) 
iE..N 
E x(i) = C(N) 
iE..N 
xCi) unrestricted 'ViE N 
If a game does not have a core, the solution to the linear 
program will be infeasible. An empty core indicates that no 
stable solution exists. Generally, this occurs when the 
additional savings from forming the coalition are relatively 
small. In such a case, the values of the characteristic 
functions for the S-member coalitions are relaxed until a 
core develops. The linear programming solution for this 
problem is: 
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minimize: 0 
subject to: xCi) 
L x(i) 
i£8 
L xCi) 
i£N 
xCi) 
s c(i), 
-
o c(S) s c{S) 
= C(N) 
unrestricted 
Vi £ N 
VS c N 
Vi £ N 
Therefore, the optimal solution is the minimum value 0, 
which results in the formation of a core (Heaney and 
Dickinson 1982:480). 
(9 ) 
In summary, the minimum costs remaining savings (MCRS) 
solution procedure includes the following steps: 
Step 1. Find the minimum [x{i)~] and maximum [x(i)~x] costs 
that satisfy the core conditions graphically or by 
solving linear programs where a core exists (8) or 
where no core exists (9). 
Step 2. Prorate the nonseparable cost (NSC), using: 
,B{i) = 
L [ x ( i ) max - X ( i ) min ] 
i£N 
NSC = c(N) - L x(i)~ 
i£N 
Vi £ N (10) 
Step 3. Find the fair solution for each PRP or PRP group, 
using: 
x ( i) = x ( i ) min + ,B (i) (NSC) ( 11 ) 
(Heaney and Dickinson 1982:481). Using the MCRS solution 
method, even the most complicated cost allocation problems 
can be solved by satisfying the core conditions either 
graphically or by solving linear programs. However, 
additional work is required when a core does not exist 
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(equation 9). Therefore, decision makers may decide to 
abandon the coalition if the cost allocation problem appears 
to be too complicated in comparison to the small amount of 
cost savings that will result (Heaney and Dickinson 
1982:480). 
Chapter Summary 
The goal in allocating Superfund cleanup costs is to 
facilitate settlement among PRPs by generating an outcome 
that is ~J.e. The use of cooperative game theory 
principles enables the allocation process to be based on 
joint participation, which should minimize secondary 
litigation involving contribution claims. Such an Qutc·ome 
would presumedly minimize delays and transaction costs. The 
use of the MCRS solution method allows the allocation to be 
based on the minimum costs and maximum savi~s to each 
participant within the coalition. Therefore, the 
cooperative game theory principles discussed above are the 
basis for the proposed allocation method presented in this 
study. 
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Chapter Hotes 
1. According to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) this principle is firmly established in 
public utility regulation. Principles of fairness in 
ratemaking support the concept that those who are 
responsible for the incurrence of costs be the ones who bear 
those cost burdens. See Butler et. ale 1993:10138. 
2. Butler also suggests that a (Jost allocation that 
cannot be performed on the basis of cost causation should be 
related to benefits received. Butler notes that although 
such an allocation may need to be based on an arbitrary 
decision, it is becoming common for judicial decisions to 
relate benefits received with equitable cost allocations. 
See Butler et. ale 1993:10138. This line of reasoning 
follows from the example of federal water .resource 
development projects that are apportioned on the basis of 
the benefits to various consumers. However, Hird (and 
others) suggests that the fundamental problem of Superfund 
liability is that it attempts to finance present-day 
cleanups caused by past damages. This becomes a problem 
when responsible parties are either unable to absorb the 
cost, cannot be identified, or are not the parties that 
benefited from the improper dumping of the pre-CERCLA. See 
Hird 1993:327. 
3. When the cost of producing two products in 
combination is less than the total cost of producing each 
product separately, the condition is called economies of 
scope. Economies of scope are generally defined as a less 
than proportionate increase in costs for a proportionate 
increase in outputs. See Biddle and Steinberg 1984:5. 
Therefore, the idea of economies of scope has been described 
as "subadditivity of costs", where subadditivity is 
sufficient to produce common cost savings. See Baumol et. 
ale 1982. 
4. Common costs result when products are produced 
together when they could be produced separately. See Biddle 
and Steinberg 1984:5. 
5. The presence of common costs generally results in 
the use of joint and several liability. Under CERCLA, the 
doctrine of joint and several liability does not require the 
government to establish a nexus (cause and effect 
relationship) between a PRP's waste and the release or 
threatened release that initiated the response action (Light 
1990). Therefore, the cost of cleaning up "nonseparable" 
wastes can be allocated entirely to one party, without any 
regard to the party's actual contribution. 
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6. A manager is encouraged to utilize a common service 
when it's use will result in a saving for the firm. As a 
result, the firm will become aware of the relative costs of 
both common and independent production. See Biddle and 
Steinberg 1984:18. 
7. For subadditive games the set of imputations is 
nonempty, but the core may be empty. See Heaney and 
Dickinson 1982:478. 
8. This line of reasoning follows from the methods used 
in allocating costs for multiagency water resource projects 
(Loehman and Whinston 1975, Heaney and Dickinson 1982, and 
Lejano and Davos 1995). 
9. If a party does choose to dispute their relative 
contribution to a site they should be prepared to prove the 
divisibility of their wastes and provide some "reasonable 
basis for apportioning damages" (United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d (1992) and Harris and Milan 1992). 
Parties that can demonstrate that their wastes were stored 
at a particular location on a site, with limited migration 
from that location, and without combining with other wastes 
will be in the best position to prove divisibility and 
apportionability (Harris and Milan 1992). It is somewhat 
expensive for a PRP to prove divisibility and develop a 
meaningful apportionment on its own. 
10 • .classif ication could be based on various 
characteristics of the parties' contributions, including, 
but not limited to, the following: (1) volume; (2) toxicitYi 
or (3) the relative risk to the human hea and the 
environment. Classification could also be based on the 
parties' financial assets. Such classifications could 
possibly result in a party being placed in two or more 
classes, therefore, the party should only be accounted for 
through one class in order to avoid double counting. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL: METHODS AND RESULTS 
various methodologies, both qualitative and 
quantitative, and subjective and objective in nature, will 
be used in this study to address the issue of allocating 
financial r p~~~ eng- multiple PRPs in an efficient 
..... - ----.... -. 
and equitable manner. The methods being used in this study 
- -
_ .......... _.-
include: providing incentives for participating in a 'oint 
cleanup effort, d~viding coalition 
----- -_._--
defined classes, and the use of the minimum cost reJl1A!~ing 
savings (MCRS) method. These methodologies combine to 
create a streamlined allocation method that facilitates 
---_."'-- '-' - - -, ..... -.--,~ ..... -"----
negotiation and promotes cooperative participation among the 
involved parties. The result is an allocation met d that 
minimizes each participant's cleanup costs while recovering 
--------- - - --- -
the ful ~Dst assigned to that particular coalition. 
--~------
Selected History of the Case Study Site 
The Royal N. Hardage industrial waste site is located 
approximately 35 miles south-southwest of Oklahoma City, 15 
miles southwest of Norman and one half mile west of Criner 
in McClain County, Oklahoma. The disposal site is located 
on a 160 acre tract of the Hardage family ranch. The site 
consisted of a number of pe,rmanent and temporary 
impoundments into which a variety of liquid, sludge, and 
solid wastes were disposed and mixed (Costello 1995). 
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On September 15, 1972, the Oklahoma State Department of 
Health (OSDH) 9'ranted Royal N. Hardage a license to 
construct, operate, and maintain a hazardous waste disposal 
facility for industrial and hazardous waste. From 1972 to 
1980, over 20 million gallons of waste were transported to 
the site for storage and/or disposal by approximately 400 
companies and state and federal government agencies. Until 
June, 1979, the Hardage-Criner site was the only permitted 
hazardous waste facility in Oklahoma (Costello 1995:1). 
In 1979, the site had reached its permitted capacity 
resulting in the use of unpermitted pits, improper 
maintenance and closure of existing pits, failure to retain 
runoff, and improper storage of wastes at the site. These 
activities resulted in a series of investigations by both 
state and federal agencies. The State of Oklahoma found 
that disposal activities at the site were in violation of 
the permitting requirements and administrative proceedings 
were initiated to revoke Hardage's permit. 
Subsequent EPA investigations determined that disposal 
practices at the site had resulted in various degrees of 
contamination to the surface water, groundwater, and surface 
soil (Costello 1995). In September of 1980, the EPA sued 
Royal N. Hardage for site investigation costs and ordered 
him to remediate the site. Mr. Hardage closed the site in 
late 1980. Subsequently, Mr. Hardage filed bankruptcy in 
1985 and was discharged from liability (Costello 1995:1). 
Appendix C provides a chronological listing of the Hardage-
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Criner site history. 
In 1984, the EPA notified companies that had legally 
disposed of wastes at the Hardage-Criner site that they we.re 
potentially responsible for cleanup at the site under 
CERCLA. Following this notification, more than 100 of the 
PRPs organized themselves into the Hardage Steering 
Committee (HSC) in order to c'oordinate the cleanup of the 
site. The EPA continued with numerous site investigations 
and divided the site into two operable units: (1) source 
control; and (2) management of migration. The HSC contested 
the EPA's evaluation of the site conditions and their 
decision to divide the site into source control and 
management of migration operable units. As a result, the 
HSC initiated their own evaluation of the site conditions 
and proposed an alternative remedy (Costello 1995:1). 
In 1986, the EPA sued Hardage and 36 of the PRPs in 
order to recover costs and to implement the agency's 
selected remedy. Disputes between t EPA and the PRPs over 
J't. -
the selection of an appropriate remedy continued for the 
next four years. 1 A remedy trial was held in December, 
1989. In August, 1990, the Western District Court of 
Oklahoma ordered the parties to implement the proposed HSC 
remedy with certain modifications. The court-ordered remedy 
required the pumping and removal of waste, groundwater 
treatment, and containment of remaining wastes on-site 
(Costello 1995:2). Appendix D offers a detailed summary of 
the proposed remedial actions, including the court-ordered 
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remedy. 
As early as 1986, the Bse began conducting remedial 
measures to prevent any possible adverse environmental 
impacts from the site. The HSC repaired and stabilized 
various disposal units, installed security fencing, 
established a field office, and employed a full-time site 
supervisor. Additional measures included providing an 
alternative water supply to residents dependent upon 
domestic wells and the buy-out of existing grazing leases on 
the site in order to stop ongoing grazing. In addition, the 
HSC has acquired the acreage necessary to implement the 
institutional control portion of the remedy, provided 
routine site maintenance, and conducted ongoing site 
inspections (Costello 1995:2). 
ib· 
The HSC has incu~ ed substantial costs as a result of 
meeting the conditions set forth in the court-ordered 
remedy. As a result, the HSC has sought contribution from a 
number of parties involved at the site. On March 25, 1991, 
the HSC, comprised of 58 parties, entered into a settlement 
agreement with approximately 22 other parties. This study 
is, to some extent, based on the data provided by this 
settlement agreement. However, in order to avoid potential 
conflict, the HSC members and various third parties are not 
referred to by company name. 
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Methods 
Due to the fact that these parties were in no way aware 
of their role in this study, certain assumptions were made 
involving their participation. T~h=i=s~~~~~~~ __ eS-Lhat 
each participant has been al19gftt~M-a~ ____ ~pa~Le-costs. 
- ----- _ .. -. -'--'" _. '- ._--
Therefore, the costs attributed to each participant 
represent the nonseparable costs (NSC) to be allocated to 
each party (See Table III and IV). A hypothetical incentive 
is also provided in order to accommodate the study. As a 
resul t, the formation of each coali t.i_QP __ ;if? pg,sed. on j.,t -!..s 
---- -----
calculated share of ~~~. &otal t~aC!~-PEst~ associa~~~ 
----- -------
with the {settlement agreement However, data on the 
'\ transaction- costs -'assOciated with. the settlement was not 
pEQ-Yided. Therefc~re ~_ i.~ _ ()r~e! to derive each coalition's 
- .- .. _._." -
calculated share, the data provided is used to extrapolate V 
---'- - -- ----- - -- --.- t(H~ 
an estimat=~ t~t_~~_ ~f the t:_ansaction~ost_~ a~~riJ?~~a~l~_!:o 
the settlemerl.~. agt:.eement.. This extrapolation is based on 
the following steps: 
- " 
where 
step 1. Identify the k otal_ tl ansaction costs (T)\ 
associated with the ~otal p~~ject cost~ t P). 
In this case $7,497, I (See Table II). d 
Step 2. Identify the percentage share (S) of the total 
HSC settlement agreement ~osts (H) in 
comparison -to the total project costs (P), 
.... , .J 
. p, or' • 
H $15,000,000 '-~ 
S -- or ( 12 ) 
P $59,543,500 
= .25% 
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Step 3. ):dentify the transaction CG ts attributable to 
the HSC settlement agreement (T1),where 
<!)= ST or (.25}($7,497,764) 
= $1,874,441 
Step 4. Identify each coalitions share _ ~~1) of TIt 
where 
Where: 
= ( .0058) + (.0497 ~ ($1,874,441) 
= (.0555)($1,874,441) 
= $104,031 
(13) 
(14) 
c1= each coalition member's settlement percentage ~ 
(See Table III and IV). 
The original HSC settl~~en~~~e~~~pt cost figures are 
----_.- .-
detailed in Table III, wh.ile the extrapolated cost figures 
are detailed in Table IV. The new project cost (H1 ) was 
derived in the following way: 
= $15,000,000 + $1,874,441 
= $16,874,441 
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(15) 
The new cost figures for each party were derived in the 
following way: 
PRP1.= (cd (Hd - PA 
= (.0058)($16,874,441) - $1,125 
= $97,872 - $1,125 
= $96,747 
Where: 
FA = credit for 50% of past assessments 
(16) 
Therefore, the new cost figures represented in Table IV are 
the cost figures utilized in this particular study. For the 
purpose of this study, these cost figures also represent 
each PRP's nonseparable cost share of the HSCsettlement 
agreement. As a res It, it is assumed that e~c!t_ p~~t~ . ~as 
been allocated it's separable costs. 
---;h;-four parties selected for this study were selected "1 
------
on the basis of their PRP status at the site. Of the 22 
--parties involved in the HSC settlement agreement, the PRPs 
represented constitute the transporter status PRPs. These 
four parties were grouped into a discernible class based on 
their transporter status. It was assumed, based on the 
discussions presented in Chapter III, that these parties 
would agree to participate in a joint clean up effort. 
The following examples are for PRP 1 for coalition 
[12]. For games with a core, the upper and lower bounds for 
each participant can be found by solving the following 
linear program represented by equation (8): 
dsi j 
I 
7 0 
7\ 
max or min: x( Y> 
subject to: x( 1) :5 96747 
~ x(2) :s 591558 
.----- -
'I 
X(I) + x(2) -/5842.7~4 
--
,., 
, 
The upper and lower bounds for each coalition are summarized 
in Table VI. These bounds identify the maximum and minimum 
payment of each party in the coalition and are essential to 
performing the MCRS solution procedure. In summary, the 
minimum costs remaining savings (MCRS) solution procedure 
includes the following steps: 
Step 1. Find the minimum [x(i)tinJ and maximum [x(i)~J costs 
that satisfy the core conditions graphical ly or by 
solving linear programs where a core exists (8) or 
where no ~ore exists (9). 
Step 2. Prorate the nonseparable cost (NSC), using 
equation (10): 
96,747 - 0 
J3 (I) = ---------------
(96,747 - 0) + (584,274 - 487,527) 
= 96,747 
193,494 
= 0.5 
NSC = 584,274 - 0 - 487,527 
= 96,747 
Step 3. Find the fair solution for each PRP or PRP group, 
using equation (II): 
x(l) = 0 + (0.5){96,747) 
= 48,373.5 
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This process is repeated for PRP 2 and the individual 
members of each coalition. The cost figures presented in 
Table V will be used for calculating the maximum and minimum 
costs for each coalition structure. These costs are 
generated by solving the l i near programming s9lution 
represented in equation (S). These bounds are then used to 
calculate the HeRS solution for each coalition structure. 
Table VII represents the least-cost solution for each 
coalition structure, as well as each coalition member's 
minimum cost. 
Results 
The following conditions were satisfied for each 
coalition: (1) the cost assigned to each PRP was less than 
or equal to it's cost of acting independently; (2) the to,tal 
cost was allocated; and (3). the cost assigned to any sub-
coalition (S) was less than or equal to the cost that the 
sub-coalition would have received by acting independently 
from the grand coalition N. The coaliti ons formed in this 
study were all feasible coalitions and fell within the core 
of the game. No participant, or group of participants, was 
charged more than its cost of acting alone (See Table VII). 
The success of this study can be measured by: (1) the 
realized savings or economies of scope; and (2) the fact 
that the total cost attributable to each coalition structure 
was a llocated. First, the savings (economies of scope) 
r eal i zed f rom the f or mation of these cooperative coali tions 
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can be expressed in terms of both individual savings (See 
Table VII) and coalition structure savings (See Table VIII). 
These savings are significant when compared with the avoided 
or stand-alone costs (SAC). Secondly, the costs assigned to 
each coalition structure were completely allocated (See 
Table V and IX). 
The decision to participate in a particular coalition 
may be based on the following factors (but is not limited 
to): (1) overall cost savings; (2) negotiations with other 
participants; or (3) an existing agreement between all 
participants. In the absence of a pre-existing agreement, 
each party will inevitably select the solution that 
minimizes cost and maximizes savings. For example, 
comparing the assigned cost for [12], [34] coalition 
structure versus the [1234] coalition structure, PRPs 1 and 
4 would prefer the two-party coalition structures. However, 
PRPs 2 and 3 are the big losers if the two-party coalition 
structure is selected (See Table VII). Similar comparisons 
could be made between all the coalition structures. 
A closer examination of Tab'le VII indicates that the 
two-party coalition structures offer significantly diff'erent 
individual savings when compared to the three-party 
coalition structures. presumedly, the members of the two-
party coalition structures would be inclined to base their 
dec i sions to participate in a parti cular coalition on their 
indivi dual cost savings. Therefore, any subsequent decision 
would be the result of continued negotiation among the 
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various two-party coalition members. Similarly, the members 
of the three-party coalition structures would be more 
inclined to. participate in the grand coalitien, due to the 
slight increase in individual cest savings. 
In terms of tetal cest savings, the least-cost solution 
is represented by the coalition structure [1234]. When 
compared with the total cost of each party acting 
independently, the [1234) coalition structure effers a total 
savings of $444,057 (See Table VIII). Therefere, in this 
particular case, the allocation entity weuld presumedly 
select the least-cost solution represented by the coalitien 
structure [1234]. Furthermore, seme consideration may be 
given to each ef the cost solutions represented by each ef 
the two-party coalition structures. H'ewever, if the 
selection of the allocating entity results in a charge that 
is greater than that of any sub-cealitiens charge, there 
will be an incentive for these participants to leave the 
grand coalitien and go at it alene. Therefore, in order to. 
avoid any continued negetiations o.r delays, the allecating 
entity may choose to arrange a no.nbinding allocation of 
responsibility (NBAR) based on the selution that represents 
the least-cest when cempared to the aveided or SAC totals 
(preferably a binding allocatien of respo.nsibility). 
The fact that these parties did not voluntarily agree 
to participate in this study did net, in any way, cempromise 
the results. However, the fact that the allecation itself 
was based on extrapelated data (due to. the need to provide a 
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hypothetical incentive) could have affected the results of 
the study. The linear programming equations generated some 
very similar cost figures. These cost figures were 
particularly similar among the three-party coalitions, while 
the two-party coalitions were better scaled (See Table VI). 
Furthermore, the HCRS equations generated very similar 
results among the three-party coalitions. As a result, the 
cost allocations for each member remained constant, 
regardless of the member's coalition affiliation (See Table 
VII). 
These similarities could be attributed to the close 
scaling of the linear programming results. The similarities 
could also be attributed to the fact that the cost 
allocations were based on extrapolated data, rather than 
data generated from the outset of the HSC settlement. In 
short, the lack of specific and meaningful data relating to 
individual transaction costs could have generated the 
similarities. Some of the coalition structures (namely the 
three-party coalition structures) are not very "attractive" 
solutions, this is a reflection of the numbers. However, 
the overall results generated from the HCRS solution 
procedure indicate that such a method could produce 
significant cost savings for each coalition. 
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ChapterSWIIIIUlry 
The methods presented in this chapter are similar to 
other methods that have been used to allocate costs among 
multiple parties (PRP classification and volume based 
settlement percentages). Due to the unique circumstances of 
each case, variations of these methods and others could play 
a major role in the cost allocation method selected for a 
particular problem. However, the methods used for 
extrapolating the data used in this study may not be 
necessary for other cost allocation problems. Furthermore, 
the results of each case will vary based on the site 
conditions, the financial viability of each PRP, the 
similarities among the PRPs, the incentives provided, and 
various other factors. 
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Chapter Hotes 
1. The Hardage-Criner Superfund Site is unique in that 
it is the only case in which the government allowed the PRPs 
(HSC) to dispute the preferred remedy. 
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TABLE II: Summary of Costs Associated with the Remedial 
Measures Ordered by the Court in August 1990. 
vertical Liquid Recovery Well System 
Remedy 
Including 
Court Order 
Additions 
Equipment, Installation/Evaluation $2,412,000 
NAPL/Water Treatment/Destruction ••••• $6,458,000 
Well System. • • • • • • • • ••••••• $ 792,000 
Permanent Site Facilities. • • • • . • • . $ 570,000 
Treatment Plant •••••••••••••••. $ 956,000 
Monitoring Wells. • • • • • • • • • $ 33,000 
Composite Cap. • • • • • • • • $4,120,000 
v-Shaped Interceptor Trench. • • • • . •• $6,230,000 
Land Purchase • • • • • • • • • $1,000, 000 
Site Restoration. • • • • • •••• •• $ 214,000 
Temporary Construction Facilities and 
Monitor ing • • • • • • • • • • •• •• $ 577,000 
366,000 
460,000 
315,000 
Closure of Existing Facilities.. • ••.. $ 
System Startup. • • • • • • • • • • • . . • . • $ 
Community Relations Program • • • • • • $ 
CONSTRUCTION SUBTOTAL • • • • $24,503,000 
Bid and Scope Contingency ... $ 4,900,600 
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS. •... $29,403,600 
*Engineering and Design • • • • • • . • 
*Construction Management. ••••••• 
*EPA Oversight. • • • • • . • • • • • . 
*General Liability Insurance/Performance 
Bond • • •• • • • • • • • • . • • 
*Legal Services • • • • • . 
TOTAL ONSITE COSTS. 
O&M Costs/Routine Equipment Replacement • 
Major Remedy Repl. Contingency. • ••• 
TOTAL PRESENT WORTH COST. • • . 
*Transaction costs; $7,491,764 
Source: HSC 1991 (slightly modified). 
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• • $ 
• • $ 
• • $ 
• • $ 
· . $ 
2,057,896 
2,057,896 
1,028,948 
882,384 
1,470,640 
• • $36,901,564 
. $15,262,000 
· . S 7,379,913 
$59,543,500 
TABLE III: ~unts and percentages-for _ th~; 
Settlement Agrgement at~4JlOJt,00 0) 
~ 
Net 
PRP Volume c(i) , Share PA Payment 
1 32,692 .0058 $87,156 $1,125 $86,031 
2 486,890 .0497 $745,604 $247,102 $498,502 
3 1,400,000 .1429 $2,143,906 $78,116 $2,065,789 
4 376,740 .0384 $576,925 $78,391 $498,534 
Source: HSC 1991 (slightly modified). 
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TABLE IV: Cash Amounts and Percentages for ''tbe HSC 
Settlement Agreement at $16,874,44f:---
-
- -
PRP Volume c(i) \ Share PA 
1 32,692 .0058 $97,872 $1,125 
2 486,890 .0497 $838,660 $247,102 
Net 
Payment 
$96,747 
$591,558 
3 1,400,000 .1429 '$2,411,358 $78,116 $2,333,242 
4 376,740 .0384 $647,979 $78,391 $569,588 
Source: HSC 1991 (slightly modified). 
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TABLE V: Total Cost to be Allocated to Each Coalition. 
Coalition Total Cost 
1 $96,747 
2 $591,558 
3 $2,333,242 
4 $569,588 
12 $584,274 
13 $2,151,260 
14 $583,485 
23 $2,563,783 
24 $996,008 
34 $2,562,994 -
123 $2,649,658 
124 $1,081,883 
134 $2,648,869 
234 $3,061,392 
1234 $3,147,267 
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TABLE VI: Lower and Upper Bounds On Costs for Four-Party 
Cost Game. 
Party Bounds: L=Lower - U=Upper ($ ) 
Coa- PRP 1 PRP 2 PRP 3 PRP 4 
lit-
ion L-U L-U L-U L-U 
12 
, 
0-96,747 487,527-584,214 
- -
13 0-96,747 
-
2,054,513-2,151,260 -
14 13,897-96,747 
- -
486,738-569,588 
23 
-
230,541-591,558 1,972,225-2,333,242 
-
24 
-
426,420-591,558 
-
404,450-569,588 
; 34 - - 1,993,406-2,333,242 229,752-569,588 
I 123 85,875-85,876 498,398-498,399 2,065,384-2,065,385 
-
124 85,875-85,876 498,398-498,399 - 497,609-497,610 
134 85,875-85,876 - 2,065,384-2,0£5,385 497,609-497,610 
234 
-
498,398-498,399 2,065,384-2,065,385 497,609-497,610 
1234 85,875-85,876 498,398-498,399 2,065,384-2,065,385 497,609-497,610 
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TABLE VII: Cost Allocations for Optimal Solution and 
Intermediate Solutions 
Coalition HCRS Cost Allocation ($ ) 
Structure 
for Least-
Cost Least-Cost 
Solution Solution PRP 1 PRP 2 PRP 3 PRP 4 
1,2,3,4 $3,591,324 96,747 591,558 2,333,242 569,588 
12, 34 $3,147,268 48,373.5 535,900.5 2,163,324 399,670 
13, 24 $3,147,268 48,373.5 508,989 2,102,886.5 487,019 
14, 23 $3,147,268 55,322 411,049.5 2,152,733.5 528,163 
123, 4 $3,219,246 85,875.33 498,398.33 2,065,384.33 569,588 
124, 3 $3,415,125 85,875.33 498,398.33 2,333,242 497,609.33 
134, 2 $3,240,427 85,875.33 591,558 2,065,384.33 497,609.33 
234, 1 $3,158,139 96,747 498,398.33 2,065,384.33 497,609.33 
1234 $3,147,267 85,875.25 498,398.25 2,065,384.25 497,609.25 
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TABLE VIII: Total Savings Realized by Each Coalition 
Structure. 
Coalition Tot,al 
12, 34 $444,056 
13, 24 $444,056 
14, 23 $444,056 
123, 4 $372,078 
124, 3 $176,199 
134, 2 $350,897 
234, 1 $433,185 
1234 $444,057 
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TABLE IX: Total MCRS Cost Allocation for Each Coalition. 
HCRS Cost Allocation ($) 
Total Cost 
Allocated 
To Each 
Coalition Coalition PRP 1 PRP 2 PRP 3 PRP 4 
1,2,3,4 $3,591,324 96,747 591,558 2,333,242 569,588 
12 $584,274 48,373.5 535,900.5 
- -
13 $2,151,260 48,373.5 
-
2,102,886.5 -
14 $583,485 55,322 
- -
528,163 
23 $2,563,783 
-
411,049.5 2,152,733.5 -
24 $996,008 
-
508,989 
-
487,019 
34 $2,562,994 
- -
2,163,324 399,670 
123 $2,649,658 85,875.33 498,398.33 2,065,384.33 
-
124 $1,081,883 85,875.33 498,398.33 
-
497,609.33 
134 $2,648,869 85,875.33 
-
2,065,384.33 497,609.33 
234 $3,158,139 - 498,398.33 2,065,384.33 497,609.33 
1234 $3,147,267 85,875.25 498,398.25 2,065,384.25 497,609.25 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS ABD RECOMMENDATIONS 
COnclusioDs 
Having established an understanding of the decision 
criteria and methods that can be utilized in the allocation 
process, the next step is to develop a formal allocation 
process. It is clear that each Superfund case will present 
it's own unique set of circumstances, such as missing data, 
orphan shares, and PRPs who choose not to participate in the 
process. In many circumstances, applying volumetric or 
toxicity based methods would be an arbitrary attempt at 
allocating cost shares among multiple PRPs. Therefore, it 
is important to realize that no one allocation method will 
apply in all cases. Equitable factors, technical 
complexities, and site specific conditions require that each 
allocation method address the unique circumstances of each 
case. Even if the process is formalized, the allocators 
must continue to use highly selective and unique allocation 
methods. 
Traditional allocation methods fail to consider 
economies of scope, and they attempt to establish causation 
where no causation can be established due to the presence of 
common costs. Public utility regulators spent years 
searching for a nonarbitrary method of allocating the common 
cos ts associated with providing public utility services 
be f or e r ealizing that such a method was impossible due to 
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economies of scope. For the environmental community to 
travel down that same path would be a wasted effo.rt (Butler 
et. ale 1993). 
Therefore, the success o·f an allocation process will 
depend on a commitment of the· involved parties to achieving 
as fair a solution as the facts of the case and the tools at 
their disposal will allow. As a result, the allocation 
model presented in this study attempts to address the 
presence of economies of scope, the allocation of common 
costs, and the cooperative participation of multiple 
parties. The model picks up where the traditional 
allocation methods leave off, providing a systematic 
approach for allocating the common or nonseparable costs 
that remain after the apportionment of any direct or 
separable costs using traditional approaches. The method 
also ensures the cooperative participation of the inv·olved 
parties by providing significant incentives for 
participating in a joint cleanup effort. 
Recommendations 
Several recommendations could be made for further 
research concerning cost allocations under CERCLA. However, 
there are some important issues that must be considered 
before any further research is conducted. In order for any 
allocation method to be successful (including the one 
presented in this study) the EPA must be willing to 
cons istently apply the settlement alternatives provided by 
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SARA and multiple parties IlUSt be willing to participate in 
joint cleanup efforts.. ODce these conditions are met the 
involved parties must identify a neutral third party for 
constructing and implementing the selected allocation 
method. 
The organizational structure of any allocation process 
will rely on the EPA's aggressive use of the alternative 
settlement approaches provided by SARA. When used 
consistently, these alternatives will promote an efficient 
and equitable allocation process in the following ways: (1) 
the performance of NBARs will provide the information 
necessary for an informed allocation; (2) the use of mixed 
funding and de minimis settlements will eliminate 
contentious and inconsequential cost shares; and (3) issuing 
covenants not to sue will promote PRP cooperation by 
providing releases from future liability. In the short 
term, these alternatives will facilitate negotiations and in 
the long term, they will help curb the transaction costs 
incurred by all parties. 
Given the litigious nature of the Superfund process it 
is imperative that the cooperative participation of the 
involved parties be obtained. An allocation method based on 
cooperative participation promotes the negotiation process 
and prevents an onslaught of unwarranted contribution 
claims. This will ultimately result in a less contended 
cost allocation as well as an overall reduction in delays 
and transaction costs. 
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In order for an allocation method to be successful it 
must incorporate the use of a neutral third party. The 
entity would preferably work closely with the Steering 
committee in recommending settlement alternatives, 
appropriate allocation methods, and facilitating 
communication among the involved parties. However, the 
primary function of the enti ty would include establishing 
the guidelines for participation and implementing the 
selected allocation method. A similar recommendation can be 
found in the Clinton Administrations proposed "Superfund 
Reform Act of 1994." Under this proposal, the EPA would 
conduct a routine PRP investigation, notify all PRPS of the 
results of the investigation, and provide them with a list 
of "neutral" pe.rsons whom the EPA has determined are 
qualified to perform an allocation. If the PRPs cannot 
agree on a neutral allocator within thirty days, the EPA 
will appoint one. The agency will make available to the 
allocator and PRPs all information pertinent to the site. 
If the parties are unable to voluntarily agree on an 
allocation method, the allocator would prepare a nonbinding 
allocation based primarily on the equitable factors found in 
the Gore amendment (Hall et. al. 1994:1492). 
This proposal is a very sound solution to streamlining 
the negotiation process. However, it would be significantly 
improved if the final settlement was a binding allocation, 
rather than a nonbinding allocation. Furthermore, the 
ne ut rality of a third-party allocating entity would provide 
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the parties with a stronger incentive to actively 
participate in the negotiations. More importantly, s 'uch an 
approach would ensure that the parties to the settlement 
would fulfill their individual commitments. As a result of 
the parties being bound by the settlement agreement, the 
cleanup would be less likely to be jeopardized or delayed 
due to continued litigation. 
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APPERDIX A 
COMPLETE DEFINITIONS OF SETTLEMENT ALTERNATIVES UNDER SARA 
• Nonbinding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility 
(NBARs). NBARs allow the EPA to "allocate percentages 
of the total response costs among PRPs" at a site. An 
NBAR is a statement from the EPA that identifies the 
PRPs, the nature and volume of the waste contributed by 
each party, and a ranking of the substances by volume. 
NBARs are not binding on the government and may not be 
admitted as evidence in court. The EPA must provide 
the information to PRPs involved in settlement 
negotiations (Cross 1988). 
• Mixed Funding Settlements. SARA authorizes the EPA to 
use Superfund monies to make up some or all of the 
"orphan shares" at a site. Under mixed funding, the 
EPA and settling PRPs share the cost of a response 
action (Hedeman et. al. 1991). There are three types 
of mixed funding arrangements: (1) a preauthorization, 
where PRPs agree to do the work and the EPA authorizes 
a claim against the Superfund for some or all of the 
response costs; (2) a cashout, where the EPA does the 
work and the PRPs pay some of the costs; and (3) a 
mixed-work, where the EPA and the PRPs both perform 
separate tasks at the site (Hall et. ale 1994). 
• De Minimis Settlements. Under SARA, the EPA may enter 
into de minimis settlements. These settlements include 
only a minor portion of the response costs and a 
relatively minor amount of the total contribution, in 
terms of volume and toxicity. The settlements allow 
small contributors to resolve their liability in the 
early stages of the negotiation process (EPA 1991). 
• Covenant Not to Sue. The EPA may grant a "covenant not 
to sue" to settling PRPs who agree to perform a RD/RA. 
This covenant releases settling PRPs from either 
present or future liability, or both. These covenants 
are typically utilized in de minimis settlements (EPA 
1991). The covenant will generally apply only to 
matters such as criminal liability, natural resources 
damages, liability of the PRP for off site disposal of 
wastes, or liability to state governments. They do not 
protect parties from future liability resulting from 
circumstances that were unknown at the time of the 
negotiations (Hedeman et. ale 1991). 
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APPBRDIX B 
COMPLETB DBFIHITIORS OF SUPBRFUND CLBABUP STAGBS 
The EPA classifies each site according to the most advanced 
stage to which it has progressed (Source: EPA 1991:10 and 
Acton and Dixon 1992:63). The stages include the following: 
• Site Discovery. Identifying hazardous substance 
releases through formal and informal investigations. 
• Preliminary Assessment. Evaluating existing site-
specific data for early determination of need for 
continued action. 
• Site Inspection. Assessing on-site conditions and 
characteristics if an HRS score should be calculated. 
• Hazard Ranking System (HRS) Score. A mathematical 
assessment of relative risks posed by a site. 
• NPL Listing. Determining those sites that are eligible 
for a Superfund financed remedial action. 
• Site Investigation. Investigations are conducted to 
determine the nature and extent of the contamination at 
the site and what remedies are feasible. 
• Remedy Selected. The cleanup strategy is selected for 
at least one operable unit. Operable units designate 
particular areas of the site or one component of the 
remedy when EPA chooses to proceed with the cleanup in 
stages. 
• Remedy Design. The design of the technical 
specifications for the selected remedy. 
• Cleanup Ongoing. Cleanup of at least one operable unit 
has been initiated. 
• Construction Complete. The capital investment for all 
operable units has been conducted. Some sites in this 
stage may be undergoing long-term treatment, operation 
and maintenance, or monitoring. 
• Delisted from NPL. The EPA formally removes the site 
from the NPL. 
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APPERDIX C 
HARDAGE-CRINER SITE HISTORY 
• Site Operation 1972-1980 
• Site Closure and EPA Site Investigations 1980-1986 
• Hardage Steering Committee Site Investigations 1986-
1989 
• Trial on Remedy Selection 1989 
• August, 1990, Federal Judge Selects Hardage Steering 
Committee's Proposed Remedy with Certain Modifications 
• September, 1990, Remedial Design and Remedial Actions 
Begin 
• May, 1993, Remedial Design Completed 
• October, 1993, Construction Contract Signed 
• November, 1993, Construction Started 
• May, 1994, V-Trench Construction Completed 
• March, 1995, Water Treatment Plant Brought On-Line 
• september, 1995, Long Term Remedy Operation and 
Maintenance Started 
Source: Costello 1995:8. 
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APPBRDIX D 
SUMMARY OF SITE REMEDIES 
The Environmental Protection Agency's Proposed Remedy.: 
• Remove a "substantial portion" of the wastes and 
hazardous substances from the site through excavation; 
and 
• use a "soil vapor extraction" method to remove highly 
toxic and mobile compounds from the subsurface. 
• Estimated Costs. The government estimated the costs to 
be approximately $70 million. The defendants estimated 
the costs to be approximately $150 million. 
The Hardage Steering Committee's proposed Remedy: 
• The placement of recovery wells in the barrel 
impoundment; 
• construction of a V-shaped interceptor trench to 
provide hydraulic control of source areas by capture 
and removal of contaminated groundwater and non-aqueous 
phase liquids for treatment; 
• construction of various interceptor wells; 
• surface water monitoring; 
• construction of a water treatment system for 
groundwater; 
• institutional controls, including the acquisition of 
adjacent property, the provision of an alternative 
water supply, site security and a fence; and 
• placement of a composite cap over source areas to 
"prevent direct contact with waste, control surface 
water flow into source areas, limit erosion of affected 
soils, reduce infiltration of precipitation, and 
provide passive gas collection and treatment". 
• Estimated Costs. Both parties estimated the costs to 
be approximately $54 million. 
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The Cour~-Ordered Remedy: 
• In addition to the various aspects of the Hse remedy, 
the court ordered that liquid recovery wells be placed 
in the main disposal area due to "the clear evidence 
presented at trial of barrel deposits in the main 
disposal area". 
• Estimated Costs. The costs for the court-ordered 
remedy were estimated to be approximately $59 million. 
Source: Costello 1995. 
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